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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
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case. This Court's jurisdiction is based upon UTAII CODE ANN. § 78-2a-2(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Did the trial uuirt civ in Holding that 75 percent of the family business was

not a marital asset, when the ^mv evidence supporting that finding was self-serving oral
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the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderates
against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to mani:fest a clear-abuse of
discretion
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marks and citations omitted).
2.

Did the trial court err in holding that a 32' Bayliner boat did not belong to

the marital estate for the marital assets which were traded for the boat? (R. o i l . ; nie
abuse of discretion standard described in Elman v. Elman, supra, applies to this issue.
3.

I

-.ic; /i: ^ a

si

. • orvette as Husband's sepa-

rate property, on the sole basis that it had been purchaser
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(R. 641.) The abuse of discretion standard described in Elman v. Elman, supra, applies to
this issue.
4.

Did the trial court err in awarding alimony to Wife which was less than her

need and less than Husband's ability to pay? (R. 615.) A trial court's determination of
alimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1205
(Utah 1983).
5.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to award attorney's fees to

Wife? (R. 632.) "An award of attorneys fees in divorce actions rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court, which we will not disturb absent an abuse of discretion."
Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final Decree of Divorce entered by the Seventh Judicial
District Court of Carbon County, Utah. (R. 400, 901.)
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Petition for Divorce was filed July 15, 2002. (R. 001). The case was tried to
the court for twelve days on March 7-10, 2005, May 10-13, 2005, June 2-3, 2005, and
June 6-7, 2005. (Tr. pgs. 4, 332, 697, 999, 1254, 1418, 1676, 1963, 2258, 2551, 2864.)
Closing arguments were submitted in writing August 10, 2005. (R. 573, 642.) The court
entered a Memorandum Decision on March 21, 2006. (R. 834.) The Decree of Divorce
was entered September 26, 2006. (R. 901.) Wife filed her Notice of Appeal October 26,
2006. (R. 912.) Husband also filed a Notice of Appeal on October 26, 2006. (R.912.)
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties ("Dave" and "Cathy") were married July 10, 1987 and separated July
5, 2002. (R. 001.) They had two children together. (R. 002.) Husband had been married
before. The trial court found that there were no significant premarital assets still capable
of separate identification as of the time of trial. (R. 885-888.)
The primary asset of the parties was a business called A-l Rental and Lawn
Equipment, Inc., which rents tools and heavy equipment to consumers and to large commercial customers. The business was formed in 1985, prior to the marriage, but at the
time of the marriage it had no significant value. (Tr. pg. 855.) At the time of formation
and at the time of the marriage, Dave owned 25% of the company and his father, Neil
Child, owned the other 75%. (Tr. pgs. 855-857.)
During the early part of the marriage, Dave worked part-time managing A-1 Rental while holding down a full-time job as a delivery truck driver. (Tr. pgs. 63-64.)
Around 1988 or 1989, Dave decided to quit his regular job and devote his full attention to
A-l Rental. (Tr. pg. 873.) Cathy testified that she was willing to consent to that arrangement only if they purchased Neil Child's interest in the company. (Tr. pgs. 857,
873-876.) There was conflicting evidence whether that purchase ever took place, but all
documentary evidence suggested that it did. This included, but was not limited to, documents Dave filed with the State of Utah under penalty of perjury, showing that after 1990
the company only had a single shareholder, which was Dave, implying it had only a single owner. (Exhibit 39.) That status did not change until after the divorce case was filed,
at which time Dave began filing annual reports showing his father and brother as direc-
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tors of the company. (Exhibit 39.) Finally, the company's internal accounting could not
be reconciled with any conclusion other than a purchase of Neil Child's shares by the
company in the late 1980s.
The company, under Dave's direction, hired its own counsel and fiercely, and successfully, resisted production of most of the accounting data of the company. Dave and
his father testified that Neil Child still owned 75% of the company, and that the buy-out
had never taken place. (Tr. pgs. 65, 2405-2407). The trial court accepted their oral
statements over the overwhelming documentary evidence to the contrary.
Dave did not present any evidence concerning the value of A-1 Rental, choosing
instead to rely solely on his claim that the company should not be included in the marital
estate. Thus, the only evidence of value was presented by Cathy's valuation expert, Brad
Townsend. His valuation is in evidence as Exhibit 94. It is based on a combination of
several approaches. On Schedule A of Exhibit 94 he weighted each of those approaches
to arrive at a final estimate of value for the company of $1,418,000. The fact that this
value is less than the $1,622,392 market value of the company's equipment is a strong
indication that the valuation is conservative. The trial court, however, valued the company at $960,000 because "[t]he gross appraised values suggested by the parties would necessarily have to be discounted by the cost of selling same and some consideration for
transportation of the equipment and for the tax consequences of a bulk sale . . . . " (R.
845.)
The parties also owned rental assets valued at between $211,000 and $324,000
outside the corporation in a sole proprietorship. This sole proprietorship was described at
-4-

trial as the "Dave and Cathy business." (Tr. pg. 135.) The assets it owned were generally in the nature of heavy equipment, and they were used by A-l Rental in its business.
(Tr. pg. 136.) No specific accounting was made of the use of the assets by A-l Rental.
Instead, at the end of the year, book accounting entries were made and cash was transferred in an amount which would maximize the ability of the parties to shelter income by
depreciating the assets of the Dave and Cathy business on their personal tax returns. (Tr.
pg. 1703.) The trial court ordered an equal division of the Dave and Cathy business and
did not attempt to resolve the valuation issues with regard to its assets. (R. 885).
The dispute over ownership of A-l Rental spilled over into identification of personal property contained within the marital estate. Dave contended that the most valuable items of personal property that were in, or had passed through, the marital estate were
the property of A-l Rental, not the parties individually. This included motorhomes,
tools, trailers, and other valuable assets. (R. 665-666, Exhibit 159.)
In addition, there were some valuable items in the garage at the marital residence.
They include a Mac tool box and tools, a Haulmark trailer which contained the parties'
personal snowmobiles, two lawn mowers, a trimmer, a snow blower, a tiller, and other
items identified in paragraph 9 of the Decree. (R. 903). Dave argued that they belong to
A-l Rental. (R. 666.) If so, their presence in his personal garage is difficult to explain.
Although Dave's claim that those items were intended for a business purpose was transparently not true, the trial court awarded the items to A-l Rental. (R. 903.)
At the time of trial there were two boats in the garage at the residence. There was
no dispute concerning the ownership and valuation of a one-half interest in the 22-foot
-5-

Bayliner boat. (R. 611). There was, however, considerable dispute about the 32-foot
Bayliner boat. Cathy testified that, when Dave bought a 2002 Corvette in September of
2001, she personally saw him count $80,000 of cash in the safe in the residence, of which
$10,000 was removed for the down payment on the Corvette. (Tr. pgs. 277, 2166.) Cathy testified that a few months later, they traded their Winnebago motorhome, along with
cash from the safe, to Dave's brother Brad Child for the 32-foot Bayliner, and there appears to be no dispute that the boat arrived at the garage when the motorhome left. (Tr.
pgs. 945-948.) Brad's cost in the boat was $67,400. (Tr. pg. 2480.) This and the purchase of the Corvette account for the disappearance of the $80,000 from the safe to which
Dave had the only key. At the time of the purchase of the boat, Wife removed the parties' personal belongings from the motorhome and put them in the boat. (Tr. pgs. 945948.) She had a clear understanding that the boat now belonged to them. In fact, there
were later incidents where Husband threatened to "sell" the boat in front of the boys. Despite this evidence, the trial court concluded that the boat belonged to Brad and was not
part of the marital estate. (R. 887).
The 2002 Corvette was purchased with marital funds in September of 2001. (Exhibit 33, pg. 8-9.) Husband claimed it was his "birthday present." (Tr. pgs. 277.) Based
solely on that testimony, the trial court excluded the Corvette from the marital estate and
awarded it to Husband as his separate property. (R. 887.)
The trial court's division of the marital estate was difficult to implement. The
court in its Memorandum Decision valued the marital interest in A-1 Rental at $240,000
and described Cathy as owning a "one-eighth interest." (R. 883.) Presumably, this was
-6-

to be offset against other value in some unknown way, and the final Decree of Divorce
merely describes her interest as a "credit" which is awarded to her. (R. 905.) The Court,
however, awarded the full 25 percent interest in A-l Rental to Dave ($240,000), along
with the Dave and Cathy business real estate ($202,000), "one-half of the Dave and Cathy business assets and bank account to be divided in kind, the parties' interest in a 22'
Bayliner boat, a "credit" of $175,000 representing Dave's interest in the marital residence, the Corvette, and various personal and other property. (R. 905-906.) Cathy received the marital residence at a value of $350,000, the other half of the Dave and Cathy
business, and various personal property. (R. 904-905.) As a result of the property division, Husband received a disproportionate share of the marital estate even if the 25 percent ownership of A-l Rental is accepted.
In the dispute over alimony, Husband claimed that he received a salary from A-l
Rental of $76,200 per year. (Tr. pgs. 172, 1101, 1214.) This failed to explain his lifestyle, and the trial court eventually found that he had limited his income for purposes of
bettering his position in this case. The court found Husband's income to be $11,530 per
month. (R. 889.) The court, however, did not provide Wife with a level of alimony consistent with the evidence of her need or of the lifestyle enjoyed during the marriage,
which had consumed all of Husband's income. Against evidence of need in the amount
of $7,217 per month, the court awarded her only $2,575 of alimony (and $1,232 of child
support, which was later taken away when custody of the boys changed). (R. 892.) The
court stated her need "seemed excessive," but made no findings more specific than that.
(R. 892.)
-7-

Finally, the court declined to award attorney's fees to either party, but again made
no specific findings supporting that decision. (R. 892.)
SUMMARY O F A R G U M E N T

I.
The trial court's property division was erroneous in several respects. Although the
division is entitled to deference, it must be reversed if the evidence clearly preponderates
against it or if it results in serious inequity. Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83 \ 17, 45
P.3d 176. This is such a case.
To conclude that Dave was the owner of only 25 percent of A-l Rental, the trial
court had to reject all of the documentary evidence presented at trial, even though those
documents were created for independent business purposes at a time when divorce was
not contemplated; and rely instead on unsubstantiated oral testimony of Dave and his
family members. Cathy testified that when Dave decided to give up his job and devote
full time to building the business, she insisted that they purchase the interest of Neil Child
so that the effort and sacrifice would benefit the family.
The documentary evidence all supported the proposition that such a purchase took
place. A-l Rental's annual reports to the State of Utah, which Dave signed under penalty
of perjury, in conjunction with the internal accounting of A-1 Rental, indicated that a capital stock transaction had taken place at precisely the time Cathy indicated the purchase
took place. Those records report that 75 percent of the capital stock of the company was
redeemed at that time. The annual reports also report that, after the redemption of stock.
Neil and Brad Child were removed as directors and the company had only one director
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until this case was filed. Immediately above the entry where Dave handwrote the change
from three directors to one director in 1992, the form instructs: "If you have less than 3
shareholders you may have less than 3 directors." (Exhibit 39, pg. 13.) Statements made
in reports to the State of Utah under penalty of perjury must have consequences, yet the
trial court gave no weight to A-1 Rental's annual reports or accounting records and gave
no reason for disregarding them.
In addition to the annual reports and internal accounting records, the records of the
company showed a loan on the books for purchase of the business which coincided in
time to the purchase and redemption transaction. In financial statements filed with the
bank, Dave also held himself out as the owner of 100 percent of the company until after
the divorce was filed. Perhaps most significantly, the parties enjoyed 100 percent of the
benefit of ownership of the company, freely commingling company assets with personal
assets, withdrawing and spending all of the free cash flow that the company generated,
and manipulating the company's accounting to minimize personal income tax, all to the
detriment of the value of the stock.
In the face of such evidence, the uncorroborated and self-serving testimony of
Dave's immediate family members was insufficient as a matter of law to overcome the
statements Dave made under penalty of perjury, and the overwhelming evidence contained in the company's accounting records.
Even if Dave was not the owner of 100 percent of the company, the trial court
erred in failing to address Cathy's arguments that exceptional circumstances existed dictating an unequal division of the marital estate. Post-divorce, Dave continues to enjoy
-9-

100 percent of the economic benefit of A-l Rental, and the trial court's failure to address
that inequity in its decision was an abuse of its discretion.
II.
The trial court's alimony award was also erroneous. Cathy presented evidence of
total need for income of $7,217. That need was partially offset by imputed income of
$1,407 and child support of $1,232. According to the trial court's findings, Dave had
ability to pay, after deduction of his expenses and child support, of $6,353. The trial
court, however, only awarded alimony of $2,575, leaving Cathy with a $2,003 budget
shortfall. The trial court gave no explanation for this decision, other than the general
comment that her claimed need "seemed excessive" in some unspecified way. The trial
court's methodology was speculative and inconsistent with Utah law, and its failure to
adequately explain its reasoning requires reversal.
III.
Finally, the trial court erred in failing to award Cathy her attorney's fees in this
case. Again, the trial court made no findings to support its decision, simply rejecting the
claim without explanation. Cathy had legitimate need, however, for assistance with her
attorney's fees because of her limited income and the relatively illiquid nature of the assets she was awarded. Moreover, Dave's activities in the case required extraordinary effort on the part of Cathy's counsel. Those activities included use of his control of the
company to obstruct discovery, refusal to supply company records in discovery, lying
about financial matters including the concealment of a $19,000 gambling loss in Las Vegas immediately before this case was filed, and failing to disclose the existence of ac-10-

counts. The trial court made no findings regarding fees, and its failure to explain its
denial of attorney's fees was erroneous.
ARGUMENT

I.

SUMMARY OF LAW APPLICABLE TO IDENTIFICATION OF
THE MARITAL ESTATE AND RESOLUTION OF SEPARATE
PROPERTY CLAIMS.

Under Utah law, the first step in distribution of property pursuant to divorce is
categorization of the parties' property as marital or separate. The Utah Court of Appeals
has described the methodology to be followed as follows:
In Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990), this court observed
that trial courts must distribute property between the parties to a divorce in
a fair, systematic fashion. See id. at 1172 & n. 10. The Burt court noted
that the trial court should "first properly categorize the parties' property as
part of the marital estate or as the separate property of one or the other.
Each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property
and fifty percent of the marital property." Id. at 1172. The Burt court continued:
But rather than simply enter such a decree [automatically], the court
should then consider the existence of exceptional circumstances and,
if any be shown, proceed to effect an equitable distribution in light
of those circumstances . . . .
Id. Thus, under Burt, once a court makes a finding that a specific item is
marital property, the law presumes that it will be shared equally between
the parties unless unusual circumstances, memorialized in adequate findings, require otherwise.
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Equal division of marital property is not necessarily equitable, and all facts and circumstances should be considered in
arriving at a final property division. Olsen v. Olsen, 2007 UT App 296 <H 24-25, 169
P.3d 765.
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There is a presumption that property acquired during the marriage is marital property. "Marital property is ordinarily all property acquired during marriage and it encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and
from whatever source derived." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. App.
1990). Marital property includes accounts receivable, tangible assets, and good will of a
professional practice, all products of labor of one spouse. See id. "[Accumulations resulting from a combination of the use of separate property of a spouse with the labor,
skill and industry of one or both of the members of the community should be equitably
divided between the two." Portillo v. Shappie, 636 P.2d 878, 879 (N.M. 1981); see also
Barkley v. Barkley, 119 Ohio App. 3d 155, 694 N.E.2d 989, 995 (1997) (marital property
specifically includes "all income and appreciation on separate property due to the labor,
monetary, or in-kind contribution of either of the spouses that occurred during the marriage"). The use of marital funds and efforts to maintain and augment an asset support a
finding that the appreciation of separate property is marital in character. See Schaumberg
v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
II.

THE EVIDENCE "CLEARLY PREPONDERATES AGAINST"
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT 75 PERCENT OF
A-l RENTAL AND LAWN EQUIPMENT, INC. WAS NOT A
MARITAL ASSET.
A.

The Great Weight of the Evidence Establishes That the Parties Own 100 Percent of the Company.

While the trial court enjoys "considerable discretion" in dividing property in divorce cases, that discretion must be exercised within certain limits. Thus, a property division should be reversed if the evidence "clearly preponderates against" the trial court's
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findings, or when a "serious inequity" has resulted. Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83
I 17, 45 P.3d 176; Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
In this case, the evidence that A-l Rental was a marital asset was not only overwhelming, but it was the most reliable evidence presented at trial. It included documentary evidence, created under penalty of perjury at a time when divorce was not on the parties' minds. When weighed against such evidence, self-serving oral statements at trial by
family members of one party, backed up by no documentation whatsoever, are insufficient to establish that the primary asset of the marriage is separate property. In adopting
the oral statements and ignoring, without adequate explanation, the documentary evidence, the lower court reached a result which was against the great weight of the evidence.
According to Dave, who had exclusive control over the records, the key documents that would resolve the ownership issue did not exist. Those documents consist of
the company's financial statements, stock books, and corporate minutes from the 1980s.
(Tr. pgs. 60, 62, 120-121.) Nevertheless, there is substantial persuasive evidence that a
change in ownership took place in the 1980s when the parties bought out Neil Child's interest.
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that the parties own the company is the way
they have treated the company for many years as an extension of the family. The evidence was undisputed that David enjoys complete freedom to manipulate company finances to his personal advantage, and that Neil Child has never derived any present economic benefit from his alleged ownership nor taken any steps to protect the value of that
-13-

alleged interest. (Tr. pgs. 86-87.) In that regard, the evidence established the following
facts:
Dave's income was not tied to performance of the company, except to the extent
that it was necessary to remove income from the company at year end to prevent the
payment of corporation income tax. (Tr. pgs. 127-129.) That removal was accomplished
in a number of ways. For a year or two Dave paid himself a bonus. (Tr. pgs. 118-122.)
Those bonuses resulted in very high personal income taxes. After that, money has been
paid from A-l Rental to Dave in more sophisticated ways. The company pays "rent" to
the Dave and Cathy business in an amount that can be offset by depreciation expenses
outside the corporation. (Tr. pgs. 123-125.) It pays personal expenses for Dave from
within the business, such as fuel, insurance, travel, etc., and writes them off its taxes. (Tr.
pgs. 91-96, 895-900, 906-908, 913-915. In 2001, it purchased a bicycle for Dave for
$2,339 (Tr. pgs. 117-118, Exhibit 86.) These strategies have successfully virtually eliminated Dave's income tax, although they are largely illegal. In 2002, Dave had total cash
income from the company and the Dave and Cathy business of $133,549, on which he
paid federal taxes of $2,951, a federal tax rate of only two percent. (Exhibit 5.)
Perhaps the most striking example of Dave's control and ownership of the company is the purchase of a Holiday Rambler motorhome in 2001. Dave maintained that this
purchase, which consumed 33 percent of the net worth of the business (Exhibit 42 p. 2)
was for a business purpose in that he allegedly planned to rent the motorhome to customers. (Tr. pgs. 55, 217-220.) That business purpose was also claimed for the Winnebago
(later traded for the 32-foot Bayliner), which was also allegedly a business asset with a
-14-

plan to rent it to customers. This never happened, of course, and the motorhomes were
kept at the family home with the family's personal belongings inside, and were used exclusively for family vacations. (Tr. pgs. 925-934, 945-948.) The only drivers listed on
the insurance of the Holiday Rambler were Dave and Cathy (Tr. pgs. 218-219, Exhibit 64.)
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This was also the case with the Winnebago (Tr. pg. 220, Exhibit. 70). No indication can
be found anywhere that the motorhomes were purchased for anything other than personal
use. Photos in evidence show personal use of the motorhome (Exhibit 72 pg. 605), and
Cathy described the boys' involvement in and excitement over the purchase. (Tr. pg.
932.) Nevertheless, Dave wrote off the entire $142,850 purchase price on the company's
tax returns, one of many examples of his dishonesty.
Other evidence that Dave and Cathy owned A-l Rental included that the main operating account for A-l, Zions Bank #048-02821-1 (Exhibit 32), was in die name of David Child and Cathy Child for several years until this divorce action was filed. (Tr. pgs.
82, 84-85.) The other alleged owner of A-l has never received any income or distributions from the business, while Dave has received over $500,000 in salaries, rent, perks,
and distributions. When 33 percent of the business' net worth went into the purchase of
the Holiday Rambler motorhome, the other alleged shareholder was not concerned. The
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very value that Neil Child testified he was getting—an increase in the value of the company—was being consumed and he did nothing.
Cathy testified that she and her husband purchased the interest of Neil Child in the
late 1980s, when Dave quit his truck driving job and decided to devote full time to building the company. (Tr. pgs. 857, 873.) Cathy felt that if her family was going to make sacrifices to build A-1 Rental, then they should purchase the remaining interest held by
Neil Child. (Tr. pgs. 857, 873.) Her testimony that they did so was corroborated in several respects:
1.

Loan on the books. According to Dave, the company's financial statements

from the 1980s are unavailable. (Tr. pg. 1073, referring to interrogatory responses by
Dave.) The first available financial statement is from 1990 (Exhibit 53.) It shows the
following debts owed by the company at that time:
LONG-TERM
NOTE
NOTE
NOTE
NOTE
NOTE
NOTE

DEBT
PAYABLE
PAYABLE
PAYABLE
PAYABLE
PAYABLE
PAYABLE

FOJAL LUNG-1ERM

-

10,999.00
16,385.55
17,503.86
9,875.00
9,720. 70
9,52 7.32

M&R - BACKHOE
ZIONS - BOAT
ZIONS-BUSINES
ZIONS -JET SK
CHASE CLARK C
FMCC-FORD F25

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBrr

74,011.43

DEBT

These entries are significant. Every entry under "Long-Term Debt" identifies the
asset which the debt was used to acquire. The third entry, "Zions-Busines[s]" indicates,
consistent with Cathy's recollection, that a loan from Zions Bank was used to acquire the
business interest from Neil Child. Dave's testimony that the money was used to buy a
backhoe from his father is not consistent with the way every other debt was tied to the
specific acquired asset on the financial statements. Further, there is no documentary or
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physical evidence that the alleged backhoe was purchased. The entry does not refer to a
general loan. There is no instance in the history of the company from its inception where
a general loan was taken out which was not tied to the acquisition of a specific asset.
Thus, Exhibit 53 evidences the loan that was taken out to purchase the business from Neil
Child.
2.

Records of the Utah Division of Corporations. Although Dave maintains

that no company records exist, Cathy was able to discover records from the 1980s that
were filed with the State of Utah Division of Corporations. (Exhibit 39.) Each of those
documents was signed by David Child under penalty of perjury. They corroborate in
more than one way Cathy's testimony, and are inconsistent with Dave's present testimony.
The first way in which they corroborate Cathy's testimony is that they show a
change in the capital accounts of the company at the time of the buyout. Sharon Kramer
(Dave's first wife) testified that she helped form the corporation in May 1985. (Tr. pg.
699.) She said there was $20,000 invested. (Tr. pg. 699.) In 1986, the earliest available
annual report record, the annual report filed by Dave showed that the number of shares
issued by the corporation was 20,000, at a par value of $1.00 per share. The stated capital of the company was thus $20,000 (Exhibit 39 p. 20):
9. NUMBER OF SHARES ISSUED (MUST BE COMPLETED)

~

Number of Shares

Itemized

Series. M Any

Issued

By Class

Within A Class

20,000

Common

Par Value

Number of Shares

Of Shares

Without Par Value

1.00

10. STATED CAPITAL AS OF DATE OF THIS REPORT (Number ol Share* Issued X Par Velue.) $

?0|PQP

Under the penalties ol perjury and asan authorized officer, I declare thai (his annual report and. if applicable, the statement of change ol registered office snd/or agent,
t been eiamined by me and is, to the beat of my knowledge tnd belief, true correct, and complete

11. B X

<

3%?T<*e2£ZnrXJ
Authorized Officer

12.
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Secretary. Treasurer
Title or Position

The annual reports for 1987 (Id. p. 21) and 1988 (Id. p. 22) also show 20,000 shares issued and stated capital of $20,000. In the 1989 report (Id. p. 19), the fields for shares issued and stated capital are blank, although the box is checked stating no change from the
previous year. The 1990 form is missing. Beginning in 1991, the annual report form no
longer requested this information.
Brad Townsend, a forensic accountant and valuation expert, outlined the basic
principles of accounting applicable to the capital accounts of a corporation. When a corporation is created, an entry is made to the "capital stock" or "stated capital" account
equal to the number of issued shares multiplied by the par value. (Tr. pgs. 1073-1075.)
Any additional capital contributed to the corporation is accounted for elsewhere. The only correct method for computing the stated capital account is to multiply issued shares by
par value, as described by Mr. Townsend. (Tr. pgs. 1075.) That general principle was also acknowledged by company accountant Kurt Rich. (Tr. pgs. 1842-1844.)
In this case, the stated capital accounts in the 1980s are consistent with the evidence that Neil Child owned 75 percent of the company and Dave Child owned 25 percent of the company. Neil Child testified that he put up $15,000 and Dave put up $5,000.
(Tr. pg. 2399.) Sharon Kramer testified that there were 20,000 shares issued. She said
that prior to her divorce from Dave she owned 2,500 shares, which was one-half of
Dave's share in the company. (Tr. pgs. 699-701.) Dave testified that he initially owned
25 percent of the company and that his father owned the balance. (Tr. pgs. 59-60.) Their
testimony was all consistent with the conclusion that 20,000 shares of stock had been is-
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sued. There is no dispute that the par value of the stock is $1.00 per share, which explains the entries on the annual reports in the 1980s showing stated capital of $20,000.
There is no annual report for 1990, and by 1991 the Division of Corporations had
changed the renewal form so the questions regarding stated capital and shares issued
were no longer asked on the form. (Exhibit 39 pg. 12.) However, beginning in 1990 we
have access to other corporate records which shed light on this issue. In discovery disputes in this case, the company repeatedly vouched for the completeness and accuracy of
the accounting records it had supplied. The corporate balance sheet for 1990 (Exhibit 53)
shows that in 1990 the stated capital of the company was only $5,000, not the $20,000 it
had been in 1988 and before:

S1OCKHOLDERS' EQUITY
CAPITAL STOCK
PAID IN SURPLUS
REIAINED EARNINGS

5,OOO.OO
8,580.76
4, 75/.51

Brad Townsend testified that there was only one reason the accounting would
show a reduction in capital stock from $20,000 to $5,000: a redemption by the company
of 15,000 shares. (Tr. pg. 1080.) This is precisely the amount of shares Neil Child testified he had owned. (Tr. pg. 2399.)

This evidence coincides with the appearance of the

loan on the books of the business for "Zions-Busines[s]," indicating that the company
purchased, and then redeemed, Neil Child's stock in the late 1980s. (Exhibit 53.) Mr.
Townsend testified that based on all of the available documentary and accounting evidence, including the evidence discussed above and the way the company has been run
since the 1980s, the only possible conclusion that could be drawn was that the company
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had purchased Neil's shares in the late 1980s and that Dave Child was the sole owner of
the business. (Tr. pgs. 1070-1071, 1080.)
The second way in which the annual reports to the Division of Corporations corroborate Cathy's testimony is in the removal of Neil and Brad Child as directors of the
company after the buyout took place, and the replacement of Neil with Dave as president
of the corporation. Dave's replacement of Neil as president is reported in the 1991 annual report (Exhibit 39 pg. 12).
In the 1992 annual report (Exhibit 39 pg. 13), Dave asked the Division of Corporations to amend its records to show that the company had only a single director. Under
Utah law at the time:
for as long as a corporation has less than three shareholders entitled to vote
for the election of directors, a corporation may have a minimum number of
directors equal to the number of those shareholders.
1989 Utah Laws ch. 113 § l.1 Under this provision, the only way a corporation can have
one director is if it has only one shareholder.
Directly above the line where Dave told the State of Utah under penalty of perjury
that A-l Rental had only one director, and thus implicitly only one shareholder, the form
states: "If you have less than 3 shareholders you may list less than 3 directors." This is
the 1992 annual report entry:

1

The provision, with slightly different wording, is substantially the same today. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 16-10a-803(b)(ii).
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Dave's entries on the 1992 annual report cannot be reconciled with his trial testimony
that the company had three shareholders at that time: himself, Neil Child, and Brad
Child. (Exhibit 39, pg. 13.) As with the other annual reports, Dave signed the 1992 annual report attesting, "Under penalty of perjury and as an authorized officer, I declare that
this annual report... has been examined by me and is, to the best of my knowledge and
belief, true, correct, and complete."
A t tria1 D a v e c l a i m e d

'

^at these entries had been misinterpreted by the State and

that he simply was attempting to change his own address, rather than eliminate the other
directors. (Tr. pgs. 187-192.) That testimony is inconsistent with the later forms he
signed. The 1993 renewal form still showed Brad and Neil Child as directors. (Id.) This
time, Dave wrote his own name and address information (unchanged from the prior year)
in the corrections column, and wrote "N/A" next to the names of Brad and Neil ((Id., Exhibit. 39 pg. 17), clearly signaling once again an intention to remove the other two directors:
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crrv, STATE 1 2#
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ADDRESS
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650-VT300 N""
. "
PRICE UT 84801
8RAD CHILD
824 NORTH 100 EAST
PRICE, UTAH 84501

14.DMECTOH
ADORES*
crrv. STATE fc IP

DAVID CHILD
8 5 0 WEST 3 0 0 NORTH
PRICE, UT 84501

03-

-UL-
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*y/fr

#££

When the 1994 annual report form arrived, it showed only one director. The State
eliminated Brad and Neil in response to the "N/A" entries and left Dave's information
unchanged as he had requested. Dave made no effort to add Brad and Neil back as directors, which he would have done had his current testimony, that the State made a mistake,
been true. Instead, he changed his own address but left the remaining information blank
(Exhibit 39 pg. 14):
BiSSCTCfiS
12.DIWCT0K

DAVID N CHILD

L_AGE» SI
CITY. STATt » IV

.S50L.ML.3O0-N
PRIC8 UT 84501

1 3 . DIRECTOR
AOOKEM

cm. STATt t zir
1 4 . DIRECTOR

v

-U_

AOOWSS
CITY. STATE t

l»

In 1995, the State form showed that Dave's street address had been entered incorrectly in response to the 1994 change form. Accordingly, he once again made a change
in the correction box, while making no effort to add Brad or Neil as directors (Exhibit 39
pg. 15):
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DIRECTORS

3« 0 2

12.0WECTOR

DAVID N. CHILD
1406 SUGAR CT
5rfY, STATE »-iP" WELLINGTON UTAH 84542

AODRESS

-J

. Civ

; ' ! • ' • • "iu:„" ..m-i* J ^ i Q A f e —

1

oa

f 3 , DIRECTOR
AODRESS
CrTY. STATf 1

Z9

1

M

h 4 , DIRECTOR

1

ADDRESS
crnt. STATE ft Z P

No further change to the corporation was made until April 18, 2003. This was the
first annual report form Dave filed after the petition for divorce was filed July 15, 2002.
The 2003 annual report is significant because Dave directed the State to "Add" Brad and
Neil as directors of the company (Exhibit 39 pg. 18):
POSITION TO CHANGE

i FL.M Director
tjRwiove

NAME

ADDRESS

Neil Child

AM,ml

252 East 400 South
^Springville

„m

UT »84663

SfcMUiielifnqiMt*)

| AAi Director

Brad Child

AMttm

924 North 100 East
UT z» 84501

$%MUM ilf n^wf4)
ADDRESS.
_$TATE

« _

The timing of this change, after the divorce action had been filed, is significant. It was a
hasty, too-late attempt to change the public record to be consistent with the ownership
story he had concocted in an effort to prevent Cathy from sharing in the company they
had purchased and built together.
3.

Financial Statements. In financial statements given to banks for loans,

Dave represented himself as the sole owner of the company until after the parties separated, at which time he carefully corrected the information in the bank's files to be consistent with his position in this case. Exhibit 33 is one such document. In it, Dave includes the value of A-l Rental at a figure which is equal to 100 percent of owner's equity
on the company's internal books (Ex. 46):
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It is apparent on the portion of Exhibit 33 reproduced above that most entries were pretyped by the bank on the form. One was not: the value of A-l Rental. That number,
which is close to but not exactly the net equity shown on the financial statements at the
time, could only have come from a conversation with Dave. If it had come from bank
records, it would have been typed along with the other entries on the application, and it
would match the financial statement. In any event, Dave represented his assets and net
worth under penalty of perjury in order to obtain loans from the bank, and the bank at
least initially got that information from Dave.
Curiously, as he did with the State of Utah annual reports, he carefully "corrected"
the presentation of his financial information after he separated from Cathy. In an application filed July 12, 2002, just three days before this case was filed, he changed the references to A-l Rental's ownership in a loan application (Exhibit 100):
Schedule F Business Ventur%$/Partnerships
1

i

Namo Arm Any Bus
You u$ P»rl Pnn

Your Position T tie
in the Business

!t~-xn~<^

y

Your % Ownership

Net Worth Business
L sted m SfrCt»on 3

Total Assets
of Business

Jtaxs£JL

/ Lr S %\

Line of Business
and Years n Bus

n

Tan ID Su nrpi

^7-DSZ.U^Ov,

l t

Prior to that, he was content to represent to the bank that he was the owner of A-1 by including its entire value on the statements. If verification of this information was so unimportant to Dave and the bank before separation, why did they suddenly behave in a
commercially normal way after the separation? Incidentally, in contrast to the valuation
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on the 1998 application, which does not match exactly any of the financial statements the
bank might have had in its file (all that exist are in evidence), the figure $847,383
matches exactly the figure on the financial statement (Exhibit 42).
While there is conflicting evidence concerning who wrote what on these financial
statements, one thing is clear: Someone had to provide this information to the bank. It is
not the kind of information the bank would have had separate access to. The banker's
speculation that the 1998 value may have come from documents in the bank's file (Tr.
pgs. 2072-2073) makes no sense because it does not match any number on any document
the bank might have had in its file. Moreover, the banker said he thought Dave was a
partial owner, yet there is no adjustment for percentage ownership. (Tr. pg. 2081, 20932095.) In reality, the banker's information on ownership probably predated the buyout of
Neil Child's shares, as he conceded it might. Regarding the source of the value figure,
banks do not make large loans without some kind of representation from the borrower
concerning his assets. In this case, the only reasonable inference is that at some time in
the past Dave told Zions Bank that he was the owner of A-1 Rental and provided the
bank with valuation information consistent with his claim of 100 percent ownership.
4.

Other Evidence. Other evidence supports the conclusion that the parties

purchased A-1 Rental in the late 1980s. Cathy testified that in the early years of the marriage, Dave had been working as a delivery truck driver to earn income to support the
family, and had spent afternoons at A-1 Rental. (Tr. pgs. 857-858.) When Dave proposed to quit his job and spend full time building A-1 Rental, the company was not able
to provide him with much income, and he worked for very minimal pay for a considera-25-

ble period of time building the company. Social security records show Dave's income to
have been $800 per month from 1989 through 2001 (Exhibit 38). The parties knew this
would be the case, and that building the company would thus involve great sacrifice. Cathy therefore insisted that if such a sacrifice was to be made, she would only consent if
they purchased Neil's interest in the company so the sacrifice would ultimately benefit
their own family. (Tr. pgs. 857, 873.) Her testimony was that this was the genesis of the
purchase transaction. (Id.) Dave acknowledged that she had expressed those desires but
claimed he had done nothing about it at the time. (Tr. pgs. 64-65.) The evidence shows
that Dave in fact quit his job at that time to work full time at A-l, that he earned low income, that Cathy worked to support the family during that time, and that tremendous sacrifice was in fact made by the family to make A-l successful. (Tr. pg. 857.)
As A-l became profitable, Dave took steps to mitigate the tax impact of that profitability. The most significant step was the ownership of major rental assets and real estate outside the company, in the "Dave and Cathy business." (Tr. pgs. 123-125.) That
business, which was a sole proprietorship, had the ability to funnel money out of the corporation to the family while sheltering it from taxes. (Tr. pgs. 135-136.) Using 2002 as
an example, when money was paid to the Dave and Cathy business as rent, it was offset
by depreciation expenses so that no tax was due on the income and an additional $25,000
of regular income was sheltered. (Exhibit 5.) In contrast, if the assets had been owned
within the company, the amount attributed to rental income would still have been offset
by depreciation but it would have been trapped inside the company, where it could only
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be distributed in a taxable dividend transaction; and the additional $25,000 of shelter on
the personal return would have been lost.
The payments made by A-1 Rental to the Dave and Cathy business were not tied
to the value of use of the assets. (Tr. pg. 140, 149, 152.) Rather, they were dictated by
the cost of assets acquired and the available depreciation deductions. This is important
because, if there had been other owners of A-l Rental, these transactions would have
been to the great detriment of those owners. In essence, rather than reinvesting profits
within the corporation, Dave was removing the profits from the corporation in order to
build up assets on the side. This siphoning off of corporate value by an alleged minority
shareholder is not consistent with the testimony of Neil Child that the only economic
benefit he ever received from A-l Rental was increase in the value of his investment.
Dave's activities had the effect of diminishing the value of that alleged investment.3

" While there may be other ways of accomplishing the same tax results using a single entity (such as a subchapter S election), there are independent reasons that multiple entities
are employed in these situations. Foremost among those reasons is separation of the valuable assets of the business from the operating entity to protect those assets from the operating entity's liabilities. That protection cannot be achieved by holding all assets in a
single entity and making a subchapter S election. In any event, despite ample opportunity
to do so, Dave did not explain why he maintains two separate entities.
3

This scheme also assisted in the tax evasion that occurred when fully depreciated assets
were sold without being reported on IRS Form 4797. If such a sale had occurred within
the business, there would have been record keeping, accounting, and reporting obligations that would have made the transactions more likely to be detected. By owning and
later selling the assets in his own name, Dave was able to characterize the transactions as
individual sales which never showed up on any records. His tax returns during that period further camouflage his activities by characterizing the Dave and Cathy business as a
real estate rental business so as not to suggest that tangible depreciated assets were being
liquidated in unreported transactions.
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B.

Discussion of Dave's Evidence of Ownership.

In the face of the foregoing facts, Dave has no contrary evidence other than his
own self-serving oral testimony and the uncorroborated oral testimony of family members who are not disinterested parties. That testimony must be viewed in light of its failure to match up to the documents and accounting records, its failure to make any economic sense, and its failure to find support in any records.
In response to the unmistakable evidence of a buyout provided by the accounting
entries and the State of Utah annual reports, Dave's only response is that those documents are untrue, wrong, or mistaken. (Tr. pgs. 187-192.) The evidence in those documents, however, was generated for independent business purposes at a time when divorce
was not anticipated. The annual reports were submitted to the State under penalty of perjury. All of those documents tie together and are consistent with a purchase of Neil
Child's interest in the 1980s.
Fulfilling her duty under Rule 24(a)(9) to marshal the evidence, Cathy provides
the Court with the following summary of all of the factual evidence supporting Dave's
position and the trial court's findings and conclusion that Dave only owned 25% of A-l
Rental.
Dave's ex-wife Sharon Kramer testified about the origins of the corporation referred to as A-l Rental, and the original marital investment by she and Dave. (Tr. pgs.
699-701.) Sharon also testified that when she and Dave were divorced in 1987, Dave
was awarded their 25 percent ownership interest in A-l Rental. (Tr. pgs. 701-702.)
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Dave testified at trial that as part of the decree of divorce from his first wife, Sharon Child, he received all of their joint 25 percent ownership interest in A-1 Rental. (Tr.
pgs. 2567.) Dave further testified that in 1987, he sold half {\2Vi percent) of his 25 percent ownership in A-1 Rental to his brother Brad for $2,500. (Tr. pgs. 63, 2567-68.)
Upon cross-examination, Dave also denied that he ever represented to Cathy that had obtained a loan and purchased his father's 75 percent ownership interest in A-1 Rental. (Tr.
pg. 65.) There were never any receipts, stock certificates, or other documentation generated regarding the sale.
Dave's father, Neil Child, testified at trial that he continuously owned 75 percent
of A-1 Rental from the date of its incorporation and that his ownership never changed.
(Tr. pgs. 2406-2407.) No documents supported those claims, and Neil's tax returns contained no entries suggesting he owned 75 percent of A-1 Rental. Dave further testified
that his brother Brad Child bought half of Dave's 25% percent ownership interest. (Tr.
pgs. 2405-2407.) The trial court rejected, however, the claim that Brad owned any interest in A-1 Rental.
Kurt Rich is A-1 Rental's tax accountant. He testified that he inherited A-1 Rental
as a client and all of its previous tax returns from accountant Hampton McArthur in 1990.
(Tr. pg. 1717.) Mr. Rich testified that the tax returns he received from Mr. McArthur included a line stating that Dave was the owner of YlVi percent of A-1 Rental. (Tr. pgs.
1740-42, 1831, 1837, 1871, 1872.) Mr. Rich further testified that all of the tax returns he
had prepared for A-1 Rental since 1990 indicate that Dave's ownership interest was \2Vi
percent. (Tr. pgs. 1734-35, 1744.)
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Delynn Fielding was an employee of Zion's Bank in Price, Utah. Mr. Fielding
testified that he worked as a loan officer with Dave when Dave obtained loans on behalf
of A-l Rental. (Tr. pgs. 2070-71). Mr. Fielding also testified that he understood Dave to
be a partial owner of A-l Rental together with Dave's father and brother, but he did not
know what percentages each owned (Tr. pg. 2081), and the basis of his understanding
was unclear.
The corporate tax returns for the years 1990 through 2003 were the only documentary evidence supporting Petitioner's position that he owned HV2 percent of A-l Rental.
(Exhibits 14-27.) On page two of the tax returns, where they report the amount of compensation paid to officers, there is a column which reports the percentage of corporate
stock the officer owns. The tax returns all indicate that Dave owned 12V2 percent. That
entry, however, is of no importance in any tax calculation, and Mr. Townsend testified
that he has seen other examples of the figure being carried over from an earlier time
without updating. (Tr. pg. 1917. In this case, the Court can infer that the figure originated when Dave Child and Sharon Kramer each owned 12.5 percent of the company.
The Court should also note that the 12.5 percent figure is contained in the same tax return
that evidences a capital stock account of $5,000. Mr. Townsend testified that those two
statements on the same tax return are mutually inconsistent. (Tr. pgs. 1087-1088.) A
capital stock account of $5,000 indicates that stock was redeemed, and is inconsistent
with Dave's claim that he still owns only the 2,500 shares he owned in 1986. Finally, the
corporate tax returns also ask the question, "Did any individual . . . own, directly or indirectly, 50% or more of the corporation's voting stock?" (Exhibits 14-27.) The return re-30-

quires a list of every such owner. Contrary to the present claim that Neil Child owns 75
percent of the company, on every single tax return in evidence that question is answered,
"Nor4 (Tr.pg. 173-174.)
The change in the capital stock account to $5,000 required an affirmative act. It
required someone to make entries in the accounting records of the company affirmatively
changing the number of shares outstanding from 20,000 to 5,000. In contrast, the 12.5
percent entry on the tax return could have been carried over through carelessness or lack
of inquiry; no affirmative act was required to carry over that figure from year to year
withbut change, and the number did not affect the tax calculation. If Cathy's position is
not true, one is left with the vexing question why someone would affirmatively change
the capital account balances in the company's internal accounting if no transactions took
place.
Cathy's position is the only one that does not require the Court to assume that numerous and repeated mistakes were made in the company's accounting and reporting.
Her position is completely consistent with the company's records, and in fact is the only
explanation that can be reconciled with those records.
Finally, in what can only be described as an act of desperation, Dave and his family members asked the trial court to consider their motor vehicle dealer licenses (Exhi-

4

The company accountant said that it would have been his practice to verify that information from the prior returns was still correct. (Tr. pgs. 1741-42.) This testimony cannot
be reconciled with the obvious inconsistencies on the tax returns. Like Mr. Rich's testimony concerning "hybrid methods of accounting," this testimony was obfuscatory, was
deliberately designed to help his client, and lacks credibility.
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bit 146) as evidence of ownership. Although those licenses are "owner" licenses, the
evidence showed that "owner" licenses are issued not only to company owners but also to
corporate officers (Exhibits 147, 148). There is no dispute that Neil and Brad are officers
of the corporation, and their corporate titles are shown on the licenses:
Owners:

l^V-Si^^XV

NEIL THOMAS CHILD V.P. NO-FEE
^-'7v/G^
DAVID NEIL CHILD PRES NO-FEE
X ^ 7 C 0 V ^ >
DONALD* BRADLEY CHILD SEC NO-FEE
XyiV^$U;f

Frar

W ^ W
H D 7

The family's evidence on this point was highly misleading and proves nothing with regard to the ownership of A-l Rental.
C.

The Company Should Be Included In the Marital Estate On
the Basis of Exceptional Circumstances.

An equal division of marital property is not necessarily an equitable one, especially where the existence of substantial property outside the marital estate skews the
post-divorce financial positions of the parties. The trial court's Memorandum Opinion
evidences no effort to address Cathy's argument that exceptional circumstances dictate a
non-equal property division in this case.
The relative standards of living the parties will enjoy if the allegedly premarital
portion of A-l Rental is not included in the marital estate will be significantly different,
not only from each other but, for Cathy, from the standard of living and level of financial
security enjoyed during the marriage. Regardless of ownership, all of the financial benefits of the company flowed to Dave and Cathy, and there is every reason to expect that
Dave will continue to enjoy all of that benefit post-divorce regardless of his ownership
percentage. This and other factors permit the Court flexibility in determining whether
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separate property that has not been commingled or augmented by marital effort should
nevertheless be included in the marital estate under extraordinary circumstances.

In

Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court held:
Premarital property, gifts, and inheritances may be viewed as separate property, and in appropriate circumstances, equity will require that
each party retain the separate property brought to the marriage. However,
the rule is not invariable. In fashioning an equitable property division, trial
courts need consider all of the pertinent circumstances. The factors generally to be considered are the amount and kind of property to be divided;
whether the property was acquired before or during the marriage; the source
of the property; the health of the parties; the parties' standard of living, respective financial conditions, needs, and earning capacity; the duration of
the marriage; the children of the marriage; the parties' ages at time of marriage and of divorce; what the parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary relationship the property division has with the amount of alimony
and child support to be awarded.
733 P.2d at 135 (footnotes omitted).
Further, even if separate property has not become part of the marital estate, the
Court retains the flexibility to consider the disparity in the parties' post-divorce circumstances as a factor as it determines whether the division of the marital estate should deviate from mathematical equality. In Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988),
the Utah Supreme Court noted that even though donated or inherited property is not subject to equitable division it may properly be considered as a factor in determining what
constitutes an equitable division of the remaining property. 760 P.2d at 308.
Cathy gave clear testimony about her concerns over financial security, which derived from financial problems her mother experienced when Cathy was younger. (Tr. pg.
852.) Dave acknowledged that Cathy had those concerns. (Tr. pg. 65.) When Dave decided he wanted to quit his only job and devote full time to A-1 Rental, at a time when he

-33-

could expect little or no income from the company, she said she would agree only if they
purchased Neil's interest. Dave agreed to buy Neil's interest. (Tr. pgs. 857, 873-876.)
Cathy then relied on her belief that the transaction had been completed. She worked to
support the family while Dave worked at a salary of $800 per month for over three years
building the business of A-l Rental. (Tr. pgs. 858-859.) Cathy also worked for the company, entering transactions into the computer at night and otherwise assisting with its
bookkeeping, all without any pay whatsoever. (Tr. pgs. 848-850.) Unless they owned
the company, her actions cannot be explained.
Cathy's belief in ownership explains why she would have acted as she did for all
those years. Significantly, there is not a single fact that ever came to her attention that
would have suggested anything different from the assurances she received from her husband in the 1980s that they had purchased the company. (Tr. pg. 876.) Everything she
saw was consistent with full ownership. Dave exercised complete control over the company. He took all profits from the company at year end. The company paid their personal expenses. (Tr. pgs. 876-877, 895-898.) The company bought boats and motorhomes
and other recreational vehicles, but only Dave's family used them. (Id.) Alleged company assets were routinely kept at the home. No other alleged owner ever came forward to
complain that the very value they now claim they were interested in, the appreciation in
value of the company, was being siphoned off by Dave. If the facts were otherwise than
what Cathy believed, then those facts were very carefully hidden from her in order to
keep her from complaining that the promise Dave made to her in the 1980s had not been
kept.
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Post-decree, Dave will continue to enjoy the ability to control 100 percent of the
company's economic benefit. The trial court erred in failing to address Cathy's exceptional circumstances argument, and the property division should be reversed and remanded for consideration of that issue if the determination regarding Neil Child's ownership of 75 percent of A-l Rental is allowed to stand.
D.

The Trial Court Erred in Valuing A-l Rental At a Figure
Which Was Not Contained In or Supported By the Evidence.

Cathy's expert, Brad Townsend, valued A-l Rental based on a combination of
several approaches. Mr. Townsend gave the most weight to the adjusted book value of
the company. This makes sense. The company has to be worth at least the liquidation
value of its physical assets. (Tr. pg. 1129.) In arriving at liquidation value, Mr. Townsend adjusted the value of equipment to reflect its true market value (it had been carried
on the company financial statements at cost per usual accounting practice). He arrived at
an adjusted asset value of $1,622,392, which he discounted by 10 percent to reflect lack
of liquidity.5 (Tr. pg. 1132.) This is the amount the parties could expect to receive by
"parting out" the company.
The company, however, was a going concern and was not going to be liquidated,
so Mr. Townsend then compared the sales and earnings of the company to standard multiplier tables that are derived from actual market transactions for companies in similar industries. On Schedule A of Exhibit 94 he weighted each of these methods to arrive at a
1
5

Cathy contends this additional 10 percent discount will never be incurred by Dave because he does not plan to sell the business. The business should therefore be awarded to
Dave at its higher "going concern" value.
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final estimate of value for the company of $1,418,000. (Tr. pg. 1132, Exhibit 94.) The
fact that this value is less than the $1,622,392 market value of the equipment is a strong
indication that the valuation is conservative.
The trial court, however, valued the company at $960,000. (R. 883.) The court
explained only that "[t]he gross appraised values suggested by the parties would necessarily have to be discounted by the cost of selling same and some consideration for transportation of the equipment and for the tax consequences of a bulk sale . . . . " (R. 845.)
The trial court's adjustments find no support in the evidentiary record, duplicate the 10
percent adjustment already made by Mr. Townsend, and were completely speculative,
particularly given uncontroverted evidence that Dave did not plan to liquidate the company. The trial court thus erroneously understated the value of the company, and of the 25
percent interest awarded to Dave, by 30 percent. The findings fail to explain the basis for
the reduction based on evidence in the record and thus require reversal.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE 32' BAYLINER BOAT TO DAVE'S BROTHER, AND IN TREATING
THE 2002 CORVETTE AS A "GIFT".

At the time of trial, the 32-foot Bay liner boat was located in the garage of the parties' personal residence. Cathy testified that they traded their Winnebago motorhome,
along with cash, to Brad Child for the boat. (Tr. pgs. 945-948.) At the time of the purchase of the boat, Cathy removed the parties' personal belongings from the motorhome
and put them in the boat (Tr. pgs. 945-948), and all use of the boat was personal.
Dave claims that A-1 Rental owned the Winnebago and that Brad Child owns the
boat. In his deposition, he initially claimed that A-l sold the Winnebago to Blue Water
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Marine for $20,000. (Tr. pg. 459-461.) He then changed his testimony to claim that he
traded the Winnebago for snowmobiles owned by Blue Water, that ended up in Dave's
garage. (Id.). At trial, he changed his testimony again, claiming that he had traded the
Winnebago for snowmobiles, and later sold the snowmobiles. (Tr. pg. 451.) In truth, he
treated the Winnebago as a personal asset and that is why he cannot recall these transactions.
Blue Water Marine has the title to the boat, although it is signed in blank (Exhibit
150). The title documents on the boats are not conclusive evidence of ownership (if they
are, the boat belongs to Peterson Marine in Salt Lake). Cathy testified that they always
used dealer stickers when they took boats out. (Tr. pgs. 938-939.) Brad conceded that he
sold his boat business many years ago and signed a non-compete agreement. (Tr. pgs.
2523-2524.) He also testified that keeping boats nominally in the inventory of the business has facilitated evasion of tax and registration fees. (Tr. pgs. 2526-2527.) Dave admitted that they owned boats that were not registered, including the 1992 boat. The Winnebago, although owned in the name of A-1 and written off on its tax returns, was never
used as a business asset and was consistently treated as a family asset. Ultimately,
Dave's credibility on other issues involving the ownership of and accounting within A-1
Rental, and his admitted willingness to commit tax fraud, must come into play as the
Court attempts to resolve this issue. To permit Dave to rely on the formalities of title to
exclude these family assets from the marital estate would be a miscarriage of justice.
The trial court also awarded the 2002 Corvette to Dave as separate property, reasoning that the use of marital funds to purchase it had been a birthday gift. (R. 887.)
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There was no evidence that either party intended the "birthday present" to constitute a
transfer of admittedly marital property to Dave's separate estate. In the absence of such
evidence, the trial court's failure to include the Corvette in the marital estate was error.
See Morris v. Morris, 2005 UT App 435 (unpublished) (affirming trial court decision
that, absent evidence of intent to the contrary, mutual gifts between the parties during the
marriage retain their character as marital property).
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF ALIMONY
WHICH WAS LESS THAN PETITIONER'S NEED AND LESS
THAN RESPONDENT'S ABILITY TO PAY.

By statute, Utah law requires consideration of numerous factors in setting alimony. The statute provides the following non-exclusive list of factors to be considered:
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i)

the financial condition and needs of the recipient
spouse;

(ii)

the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce
income;

(iii)

the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;

(iv)

the length of the marriage;

(v)

whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor
children requiring support;

(vi)

whether the recipient spouse worked in a business
owned or operated by the payor spouse; and

(vii)

whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to
any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for
education received by the payor spouse or allowing the
payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.
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(b)
alimony.

The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining

(c)
As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant
facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on
the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time
of the marriage.
(d)
The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to
equalize the parties' respective standards of living.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(8) (emphasis added). The Utah Court of Appeals has described the alimony standard in the following language:
It is well established that the "'function of alimony is to provide support for
the [receiving spouse] as nearly as possible at the standard of living [he or]
she enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent the [receiving spouse] from
becoming a public charge."' To attain these goals, the trial court must consider (1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the
ability of the receiving spouse to support him or herself; and (3) the ability
of the payor spouse to provide support.
Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 879-80 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted).
A.

Cathy ys Expenses And Ability To Support Herself.

The trial court determined that Dave's income was $11,530 per month (R. 836),
and that Cathy's income was $1,407 per month (R. 838).
Cathy's proposed budget for herself is in evidence as Exhibit 73. It shows a
monthly need of $7,217. This amount is substantially less than the parties lived on during the marriage, and it allows nothing for the sorts of extravagances the parties enjoyed
during the marriage. Exhibit 73 presented that budget side-by-side with a report of actual
spending during the period of separation. (Tr. pgs. 963-965.) Additional funds were
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needed in the area of travel and entertainment with her boys, which has been severely restricted since separation and has not been consistent with the parties' lifestyle during the
marriage. (Tr. pgs. 964-965.) Other additional funds were needed to pay income tax on
alimony, to pay health insurance, and to pay additional expenses that have not been hers
during the separation or which have not been at the pre-separation level. (Tr. pgs. 966973.)
The $7,217 was reduced by $1,232 in child support and $1,407 income imputed to
Cathy, leaving need of $4,578. The court said that figure "seemed excessive," but did not
make specific findings in that regard or further elaborate on Cathy's need for alimony.
Instead, the court's reasoning process in awarding alimony of only $2,575 reflects a reasoning process which is not consistent with Utah law on the subject:
I have been using gross figures for purposes of determining support, but for
purposes of alimony a net figure is required. But even giving a wide berth
for state and federal income taxes, social security etc., I conclude that Mr.
Child has available to him on a gross monthly basis an amount equal to the
average gross monthly earnings (including bonuses) for the 1996 through
1999 period previously alluded to herein, to wit: $11530 approximately.
Subtracting the $1232 support leaves a balance of $10300 approximately
again. Reducing this figure by 50% which I deem generous to account for
Social Security taxes, State and Federal with holding taxes and a generous
return on investment (I don't want to kill the goose that lays the golden
egg) leaves a balance of some $5150.00 which if divided in half gives Mrs.
Child alimony of $2575.00. Even the combination of her attributed earnings, support and alimony only reaches $5214.00 not the $7217 that her exhibit 73 outlined she needed, but which seemed excessive to this Court, but
I believe it is a reasonable amount to be awarded as alimony herein.
(R. 846-47.)
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B.

Dave \s Proposed Budget.

At trial, Dave presented a proposed budget (Ex. 157) showing that his claimed
need for his own support was $4,907 (prior to payment proposed child support of $962),
or a net need of $3,945. The trial court made no findings regarding the reasonableness of
Dave's claimed need. However, accepting that figure at face value, the arithmetic is as
follows:
Dave

Cathy

Income

$11,530.00

$

1,407.00

Child Support

- 1,232.00

+

1,232.00

Alimony

- 2,575.00

+

2,575.00

Budget
Excess / (Shortfall)

7,723.00

5,214.00

3.945.00

7.217.00

$ 3,778.00

($ 2.003.00)

The foregoing evidence and calculations clearly showed that the alimony award
was not limited by Dave's ability to pay. The trial court's failure to consider the factors
required by statute and case law in reaching its alimony award, and its failure to support
the award with appropriate findings, requires reversal.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD PETITIONER HER ATTORNEY'S FEES.

The trial court erred in its failure to grant Cathy's request for attorney's and expert's fees incurred in prosecuting this action.
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Awards of attorney's fees must be fc4based on evidence of the receiving spouse's
financial need for attorney fees, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested award." Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 568 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).
Reasonable attorneys fees are not measured by what an attorney actually
bills, nor is the number of hours spent on the case determinative in computing fees. In determining the reasonableness of attorney fees, . . . [a] court
may consider, among other factors, the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the
number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the amount involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved.
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted).
In the Morgan, case, the Court of Appeals affirmed a finding of need based on the
wife's lack of income, even though the property settlement in the case would have been
sufficient to pay the fees upon liquidation, because comparing the situation of the parties
the husband had the ability to pay fees from income without invading property. This case
is similar. Cathy has a need for payment of attorney's fees because of her lack of income
and because of the relatively illiquid nature of the property she will receive. Further, as
discussed below, it would be inequitable to allow Dave to engage in conduct that substantially drove up fees and then permit the resulting fees to diminish Cathy's award of property in this case.
In that regard as well, the Morgan court faced a situation not unlike the one before
this Court. Dr. Morgan obstructed access to information, prevented disclosure by companies in which he owned interests, hid accounts, and otherwise made Mrs. Morgan's
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task in identifying and valuing the marital estate extremely difficult. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's finding that:
this was a complicated estate and presented difficult legal and factual issues
under the best of circumstances. The task of locating and valuating the assets of the marital estate [was] complicated and made more difficult by [Dr.
Morgan's] failure to cooperate, thereby necessitating extensive formal discovery.
854 P.2d at 570.
The difficulty of obtaining information in this case was greater than it was in the
Morgan case. Mr. Townsend likewise testified to the unusual difficulty in obtaining information in this case. (Tr. pgs. 1152-1154.)
At the temporary hearing in this case, the Court declined to award Cathy any money in temporary relief to cover her attorney's and expert fees. This gave Dave a clear incentive to obstruct her access to information. He was well aware that Cathy did not have
funds to pay for a protracted battle, and so he erected every obstacle he could, eventually
hiring separate counsel for A-l to further obstruct her access and drive up her expenses.
His objective was clear: He wanted to starve her out of the litigation, forcing her to give
up without getting to the bottom of the ownership issues.
Dave controlled A-l Rental. An invisible line existed which Cathy was not permitted to cross but which Dave crossed at will. A-l's information was available to and
freely shared with Dave and his lawyer, but Cathy had to fight to obtain every last scrap
of information and never got most of it. That left her to reconstruct transactions and accounts that were readily available in the company's records, including its electronic
records. Dave refused to disclose asset lists until the very end, and then disclosed only

-43-

partial information. He caused the company to engage separate counsel to resist Cathy's
efforts to discover information regarding the company, and the resistance that was put up
was ferocious.
By way of example, Cathy learned of a $19,000 gambling loss incurred by Dave
on March 20, 2002 when she subpoenaed casino records from Nevada. In his deposition,
like at trial, Dave characterized his gambling as minimal. The records told a different
story. Cathy had to issue subpoenas through the Nevada courts, using Nevada counsel, to
obtain the records. When they were obtained, Dave refused to agree to their authenticity,
which forced the taking of two depositions to establish admissibility and accuracy of the
records.
Another example concerns the ownership of A-l Rental. Dave never produced a
single record to substantiate his claims, yet asked the Court to preclude Cathy from inquiring into the issue, essentially demanding that all parties simply accept his version of
events. In spite of that obstruction, Cathy developed through third party sources strong
evidence of ownership, but that evidence was difficult and expensive to assemble. Like
the casino costs, those costs resulted directly from Dave's refusal to cooperate and his affirmative obstruction of information.
Another example of misinformation designed to obfuscate the path to important
information concerned a $100,000 home loan.

In his deposition and at trial, Dave

claimed that the loan was used to pay for the house, because questions were being raised
about where the money came from to pay for the house. At trial, it was eventually established that most of this loan went to the purchase of equipment and that the loan was tak-44-

en out after the home was finished. In the deposition, Dave admitted some of the money
had been used to purchase equipment. When pressed to disclose how much, he said
$8,000 and described the forklift as a "warehouse" forklift. (Depo. p. 116.) At trial, it
was established that the forklift actually cost $70,400. (Ex. 28 p. 354.)
There are many gaps in disclosure that were never resolved. For example, at trial
Dave produced a document ostensibly showing that a portion of the time share purchase
had been placed on a credit card (ex. 155). The credit card number was previously undisclosed, and there is no record of payments made on that card from personal funds (see
ex. 28). Another example is contained in the GM credit card statements. Account statements or histories are in evidence for every bank account disclosed by Dave or A-1 Rental in this case. Yet on page 4 of Exhibit 35, there is a payment on the GM card of
$2,799.90 which did not come from any of the bank accounts in evidence in this case (see
account records at ex. 32, p. 74, ex. 30, p. 11 ex. 28, pp. 414-25):
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A third example concerns the 2002 tax refund of $11,124 federal and $2,189 state (ex. 5).
There is no evidence of deposit of those refunds into joint funds, and no explanation at all
of where they went. These non-disclosures show why extraordinary efforts were required
to identify and quantify the marital estate in this case.
In hearing after hearing, Dave and his lawyers obstructed access and asked the
Court to prohibit Cathy from obtaining further information. They characterized the information she already had as complete, a claim that was demonstrably not true. Moreo-
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ver, the reliability of the information that was provided was, as Dave admitted on the last
day of trial, tainted by his commission of repeated instances of tax fraud. Yet at trial
when these issues came up, Dave's response was that Cathy should have tried even harder to get the information.
Under the circumstances, Cathy's fees and costs were reasonable. Yet the trial
court refused to award any fees. The court made no findings and gave no explanation for
its decision, and its decision must be reversed for those reasons:
"'The decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. However, the trial court must
base the award on evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the
payor spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested
fees.'" Moreover, "[s]uch an award must be based on sufficient findings"
regarding these factors. Our supreme court has stressed, 'The trial court
. . . must make the findings of fact explicit in support of its legal conclusions. . . . Without adequate findings of fact, there can be no meaningful
appellate review." We also have held that "unless the record 'clearly and
uncontrovertedly supports' the trial court's decision, the absence of adequate findings of fact ordinarily requires remand for more detailed findings
by the trial court."
Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, f 18, 19 P.3d 1005 (citations omitted).
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Cathy requests that this Court reverse the trial court's
conclusion that A-l Rental was not a marital asset, and remand the property division to
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with that conclusion. Similarly, Cathy
requests that this Court reverse the alimony and attorney's fees decisions of the district
court and remand those issues to the trial court for further consideration applying appropriate legal standards.
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ADDENDUM

Memorandum Decision (R. 834-849), March 21, 2006
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 880900), September 26, 2006
Supplemental Decree of Divorce (R. 901-908), September 26, 2006

ADDENDUM 1

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CATHY CHILD,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner,
VS
DAVID N. CHILD,
Respondent.

Case No. 024700194
Judge Bruce K. Halliday

The Court took under advisement the divorce matter herein and subsequently received
written closing arguments from the parties. There have been, since that time, various pleadings
which raise new issues of custody and/or visitation not presented to this Court originally. I have
concluded that it is appropriate for me to make my ruling based upon the evidence received during
trial, and to address any custodial changes and/or visitation arrangements which need to be
addressed on an ad hoc basis as circumstances require sometime in the future, thereby not delaying
the limited custodial, visitation, property, alimony and support rulings originally sought.

I,

therefore, proceed to decide the case as originally presented.
The petitioner's theory essentially was that everything acquired by the parties since their
marriage was and is marital property including a 100 percent interest in A-1 Rental. The Court has
concluded that the petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, this theory.
The respondent's theory was somewhat different, to wit, that the only marital property was
property that the parties acquired in the Dave and Cathy Child Business and the home property.
Both parties seem to agree that the home was and is marital property and must necessarily be divided

and distributed by the Court. The Court concludes that the Respondent failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that A-1 Rental was entirely premarital property or that he only
owned a 12 14 percent interest in the A-1 Rental business. The Court has previously indicated that
I believed that the Dave and Cathy Child accounts and machinery acquisitions are and were 100
percent marital properties and should be divided on an equal basis since the marriage was of long
duration and both parties contributed to the growth of the marital estate in essentially equal parts.
I further conclude from the evidence that at the time of this marriage, the respondent owned a 25
percent interest in A-1 Rentals. He has not convinced the Court by a preponderance of the evidence
of his claimed sale of half of his 25 percent interest. The failure to execute the necessary
documents to establish any such conveyance of interest, the Court finds compelling. The receipt
of moniesfroma brother for the purposes that respondent alleged were to be accomplished smacks,
to this Court, more of a loan than a sale of a property interest. The claim of a transfer of interest,
coming after the separation of the parties, combined with the petitioner's response to that alleged
claim, andfinally,the response of other family members to that claim confirms in this Courts mind
that the Respondent again has failed in carrying his burden to establish the ownership interests
claimed. I, therefore, conclude that the respondent at the time of marriage owned a 25 percent
interest in the A-1 Rental business and continues to own a 25 percent interest in that business. I
further conclude that any and all increases in the value of that 25 percent interestfromthat time was
and is an increase in the marital estate on the same proportional basis as the original ownership.
It appears obvious to this Court that the respondent has always obtained substantial monetary
and/or other gainsfromthe equipment rental business substantially greater than any specific salary
or bonus paid. The access to boats, trailers, various water craft and/or four-wheel all terrain vehicles,
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trailers for transporting same as well as mechanical equipment, tools and the like were perquisites
of significant value. They are properties which respondent claims were always owned by A-l
Rental and if I agree would reduce some of the assets distributable as marital property. But, clearly
they are evidence of the life style this family was able to enjoy through their common efforts during
this marriage. It is extremely difficult for the Court to place values upon the use of equipment.

The ability to avoid, if not evade, tax liabilities in a closely-held corporation situated as this
company is, creates exceptionally difficult evaluation problems also. I believe that for purposes
of dividing the properties and allocating support and/or alimony monies, the four years of salary
and bonus payments made to Mr. Child during 1996,1997,1998 and 1999 create the best baseline
for making those decisions of any and all the evidence proposed by the parties. Those amounts
would be $79,600, $130,680, $121,600, and $221,600 respectively making a total of $553,480
which when divided by the four years makes an average yearly salary of $138,370 and an average
gross monthly salary of $11,530, which this Court finds is representative of the actual monies
and/or benefits which the parties had available to themfromMr. Child's efforts. Similarly, the years
of 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997 the last years worked by Mrs. Child reflect her contributions
monetarily to the family and represents the approximate amount she will need to contribute going
forward. Using salaries and bonuses avoids, to some extent, the complications spawned by the
parties efforts to configure their income and values placed on the various properties to each of their
own advantage and/or the disadvantage of the opposing party. It also gives to the Court the latitude
necessary for me to make an equitable division of the properties and/or incomes of the parties to
provide for a standard of living consistent with the standard of living developed over the period of
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this marriage. These average amounts place the income of the parties above the statutory maximum
of $ 10,000 per month upon which to base the support payments pursuant to the Statutory Guidelines
and therefore justify the Court in ordering the support payments be set in the amount of $1400 per
month until the first child reaches the age of eighteen, at which time the support should decrease
pursuant to the statutory scheme. The Court believes that by attributing to Mr. and Mrs. Child the
foregoing income on an annual basis and carrying same forward for a period of time essentially equal
to the term of this marriage as I define the same hereafter, to wit: 15 years, (beginning with the
marriage on July 10,1987 and terminating with thefilingof the petition herein on July 15,2002) will
provide the necessary resource to provide the support and alimony awarded herein.
Because both parties proceeded through the entire trial on the basis of their underlying
theories, the Court has enormous amounts of information which do not materially assist me in
making the distributions necessary and in keeping with the theory which the Court believes the
evidence supports. The evidence does not easily break outfromeither parties' exhibits and therefore
requires some extrapolation, and considerable weighing of the testimony of the one side against the
other side to attempt to reach an appropriate and sustainable decision relative to the multitudinous
claims raised by the parties herein. It is the Court's conclusion that I should proceed to divide any
and all of the properties in a way that avoids the necessity of any long continuing contact between
Mr. and Mrs. Child in attempting to work out the final details. In this light, the Court has decided
to award, many of the contested properties to the A-l Corporation and/or Mr. Child and give to Ms.
Child an offsetting award in the form of alimony that will allow her, instead of owning some of the
various equipment and maintaining them, to rent similar items and continue a reasonably close living
situation to that which existed prior to the separation of the parties. Further, it is the conclusion of
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this court that Mr. Child is in the position of being able to better provide such a standard of living
for Ms. Child if the business properties remain essentially within his ownership and the ownership
of his father.
There was some testimony during the course of the proceedings which suggested that Mr.
Child's father intended to use the corporate structure as a method of distributing to his heirs some
of the munificence of his various business efforts. The procedure outlined here interferes with such
plans in the most minimal fashion.
It is the Court's conclusion that the salary and bonuses paid to David Child during the earlier
period of time is really in fact representative of the amounts necessary to pay for a lifestyle similar
to that which Mr. and Ms. Child enjoyed during the course of their marriage up to and including the
present time. The Court has, in an attempt to make the determination as equitable as possible,
averaged the salary which Mr. Child admitted for each of those four years, along with the bonuses
for each of those four years, and has taken an average of the salary plus bonus and believe that it is
representative of the income needed to pay for the lifestyle which the Childs lived.
As I indicated earlier, I believe that the years of 1994 through 1997 represent the
approximate average cash contribution which Cathy Child made during the course of the marriage
and also is representative of the income which is or should be available and therefore attributable
to Ms. Child in the computations of alimony and/or support. Those amounts, pursuant to Exhibit
#37 are $12,376; $21,689; $22,584; and $10,920, making an average yearly contribution of
$16,892.25, or $1407 monthly. The Court concludes that this monthly average should be the
amount attributable to Ms. Child in making computations of child support and/or alimony. The
Court further concludes that the nine years that the respondent has not been employed, but during
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which she assisted in the business, took care of the home, took care of the children, and most
recently has attempted to improve her employability through her educational efforts, essentially
supported by Mr. Child and especially after the issuance of the Temporary Order herein exhausts any
requirement that Mr. Child assist Ms. Child in her relocation and/or re employment training. Mr.
Child should therefore not be required to pay for any additional education and/or improvement of
skills for Ms. Child and she should attempt to re-enter the job market at the highest salary possible
at this time.
Clearly, all of the monies which this family generated, together with all of the perquisites,
tax benefits, and property benefits which the various businesses generated, provided this family with
a superior standard of living which this Court should attempt to see that both parties can continue,
given their financial talents.
When the Court first became involved in this case at the original Order to Show Cause
hearing, the disparity between the parties' contentions was evident. As the matter has progressed,
the disparity has only increased. The Court attempted at the time, to indicate to the parties, that it
has been my experience that when two people divorce there never is enough money to really put the
parties in the exact same position as they were in during the marriage. It has been the Court's
experience that there was not enough money while they were living together and when they take on
two homes instead of one, and essentially two of everything instead of one, the money does not
stretch far enough. The Court suggested at that original hearing that Ms. Child would have to return
to the workforce some place along the line in order to continue the standard of living which she
desired. It is the Court's continuing conclusion that this will be necessary. It further appears that
Ms. Child has attempted to prepare herself for better employment and that Mr. Child has assisted
-6-

her in doing this with the payments paid under the original temporary order.
The period of Mr. Child's employment that appears to be most relevant to the Court's
deliberations in this matter were the years 1996 through 1999 inclusive when Mr. Child was paid
extra monies for the extra efforts that he undertook on behalf of A-1 Rentals. During this period
monies were generated sufficient to pay a greater level of compensation and at the same time
accumulate various equipment so that the major investor, Mr. Child's father, was comfortable in the
increase in the value of the business as a return on his investment. The salary history of Cathy,
which the court has used in forecasting her earnings was for the period 1994 through 1997, the last
four years that she was employed. The Court has not increased or decreased either parties salary by
the amounts of monies earned or lost in the Dave and Cathy Enterprise. All of those monies appear
to have been used by the parties in improving their lifestyle or increasing the value of their business
through the purchase and/or the improvement of equipment, etc. It does not appear to be, at this
point in time, a source of income for either of the parties and the Court has concluded that the assets
of the Dave and Cathy Enterprise should be sold and distributed to the parties on an equal basis.
The Court does not want to become bogged down in making a division of the various assets
acquired and accumulated by the parties and therefore, except for a few separate items which the
Court hereafter specifically refers to, it is the intention of the Court that any and all items not
specifically disposed of, and which were listed in either party's exhibits or closing arguments as coowned, should be divided on a 50/50 basis. The individually owned items listed by Respondent for
he and petitioner in his closing argument are confirmed as individually owned. The Court concludes
that first choice should be given to Mrs. Child and then alternating choices made by the parties for
any and all of the remaining individual items. The Court believes that as the items become less
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valuable, it maybe helpful for the parties to choose two, three, five, or ten at a time and then
alternate those two, three,five,or ten at a time choices. The foregoing is altered by my conclusion
to award to A-l Corporation all of the personal properties listed by Mr. Child as belonging to that
Corporation. This to some extent mitigates the somewhat "generous" amount of salary I use for Mr.
Child in the computations herein.
The parties have had their own vehicles during the course of the marriage and although they
had access to each other's, the Court awards the 1999 GMC Suburban to the petitioner and the 2004
F350 to the respondent. In addition, the evidence convinces the Court that the 2002 Corvette was in
fact a gift to the respondent and it should be his sole and separate property subject to any debt thereon
which should be paid by respondent. The jewelry presently in the petitioner's possession also was
a gift to the petitioner and should be her exclusive separate property. The Court concludes that the
22' Bayliner with the trailer is owned 50 percent by these parties as a marital asset. The value should
be established at $8,000, and the boat itself should be awarded to the respondent and a credit for one
fourth of the above value, to wit: $2,000 be placed in a column as a credit for the petitioner. The
Court cannot conclude from the evidence that the parties hereto have any ownership interest in the
32f Bayliner and trailer and orders the same be returned to Blue Water Marine forthwith. I choose
not to make any distribution of the Honda XR70, XR80, XR100, which were allegedly property of
the children.
In attempting to address all of the various issues raised in the various hearings, the Court is
going to use the marital assets schedule attached as the last page of closing arguments by Petitioner's
attorney to hopefully address most of the assets which I wish to address individually. . Beginning
with the checking and savings accounts, the Court concludes that the Zions' Rental Business Account
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#48-472419 was and is in fact the Dave and Cathy Child Business Account and was in the
approximate amount of $60,257 and some cents, on or about February of 2005. The testimony was
to the effect that Mr. Child subsequently removed moniesfromthis account to assist him in payment
of his living expenses. All of which was without this court's permission and should be, on that basis
alone, disallowed. Mr. Child is ordered to return to the account any monies takenfromthis account
for personal use, including any payments on the Corvette previously determined to be a gift. He is
further ordered to pay into this accountfromA-l Rental any rental monies due and owing for the use
of the Dave and Cathy Child rental properties. That account, after those payments are put in, but after
removing any and all necessary expenses, such as taxes on the properties, any and all legitimate
maintenance costs, etc., should be divided equally between these two parties. It is of course the
Courts intention that those amounts authorized in hearings after the conclusion of trial for the
payment of counseling and professional advice etc. regarding the custodial problems be subtracted
and attributed equally to the parties. The Court concludes that the $800 in account #291 is a marital
asset and should be divided equally between the parties. The $8500 in Account #441 does appear to
be the remainder of Mrs. Child's share of the monies that I divided under my April 22,2003 Order
on Order to Show Cause and belongs to her. The $2000 allegedly in the safe at the personal residence
is also marital property and should be divided equally. If any of the foregoing accounts has been
reduced, the party having possession of the asset or the passbook shall be charged with that
possession and must make up the difference. The $4500 investment in Central Bank Corporate Stock,
the parties agree, is the sole and separate property of David and should be awarded to him free and
clear of any claim by the petitioner thereon.
The retirement accounts for each of the parties should be awarded as indicated in the
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petitioner's document so that $10,384 of Ms. Child's retirement be awarded to her as sole and
separate property and that the remaining $34,896 be awarded to her as her share of the property
acquired during the marriage and the $33,867 which was acquired during the marriage by David Child
should be awarded to him. The two essentially offset each other.
The personal residence should be awarded to the petitioner free and clear of any claim by the
respondent thereon and the Court values the same at $350,000, pursuant to the various testimony of
the parties and/or appraisers, none of whom seem to have necessarily considered all of the factors,
which the Court deems necessary to be considered. If they did consider the factors, they gave what
the Court believes to be inappropriate weight thereto and distorted the values. Mr. Child should be
given a credit in his column for one half of that value. The Time Share in Mazatlan the Court
awards to the respondent and places no value thereon, but it requires him to pay any and all arrearages
or at least to terminate the property interest with no financial burden to the petitioner herein. As
indicated previously, the Court awards the rental properties held in the Dave and Cathy account and
referred to as the "Harmond Property" and "Second South Property"to Mr. Child at the appraised
values agreed to by the parties, to wit: $87,000 and $115,000. Mrs. Child shall have an offsetting
credit of one half, or $101,000.
The various adult toys not designated as belonging to the children of these parties should
be placed in the property lists to be divided by the parties themselves by making individual,
alternating, choices.
The Court believes that David Child furnishings estimated at a $5,000 value should not be
considered marital assets of this marriage, the same having been acquired after the separation of the
parties and using Mr. Child's income. The Court does not deal with valuing any of the Dave and
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Cathy's rental business assets and/or depreciated assets. The assets having been ordered sold and
divided previously, and since both parties have had the benefit of the depreciated assets during the
marriage, each should share equally now. The Haulmark trailer, alluded to in petitioners' exhibit
the Court cannot determine to be owned by the parties and therefore orders the same to be returned
to and become part of the inventory of A-l Rental. This finding should also apply to the large tool
box at the residence and the floor lift at the residence. Finally, any tax refunds received or to be
received should be designated to be marital property and should be divided equally between these
two parties up to the year this Court granted the Divorce in the Bifurcated hearing. The same may
be necessary going forward depending upon how the parties file their income tax returns prior to the
effective date of their divorce. The Court does not find that the petitioner established the ownership
of 100% of A-l Rental & Equipment Company but only a 25% interest which should be divided
equally between the parties. The valuation, again of that company and the equipment and/or "Blue
Sky" for that business is a matter of great concern to this Court and an extremely difficult matter to
value under these circumstances. As indicated above, the Court has ordered that some of the
properties claimed by Ms. Child be returned to owners other than Mr. and Mrs. Child individually.
However, some of those values, specifically the Haulmark Trailer being returned to the A-l business,
would reasonably raise the value of the business, at least by the amount of the value of that trailer,
some $6,500, if petitioners' appraiser is to be believed. However, again the Court did not find much
of the evidence helpful in making a determination of what this minority interest in a small, but
closely-held family corporation should fetch, on the open market. Clearly, I have determined that
whatever the value, the first five thousand dollars should be returned to Mr. Child as premarital
property. This Court cannot see how this business is worth as much proportionately as the Dave and
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Cathy Business due mainly to the fact it is a minority interest. There are really no barriers to entry
into this type of business and very little value to the licenses which are held by the business. The
gross appraised values suggested by the parties would necessarily have to be discounted by the cost
of selling same and some consideration for transportation of the equipment and for the tax
consequences of a bulk sale have all convinced this Court that the reasonable market value of the
whole company approximates the sum of $960,000, making Mrs. Child's one-eighth interest worth
$120,000. I believe that Mr. Child had a good grasp on the value of the various assets and was
impressed with the completeness of the inventories and his description (both good and bad) of the
various items. Even considering the items which I have returned to A-l, I believe the above values
are reasonable especially considering the uncertainty of market conditions alluded to by the parties.
All of the foregoing evaluations, I believe are equalized/modified and/ or mitigated by this court's
determination of Mr. Child's earnings ability and what I have alluded to as the somewhat "generous"
nature thereof. It may be appropriate to note here that I have purposefully not made provision for
sales fees on the home nor income tax consequences on any of the other properties ultimate
disposition, concluding that sales decisions are left up to the parties and they are best positioned to
minimize them. Nevertheless if complete liquidation is needed each will have to again pay their fair
share. I also wish to point out that the value of A-l Rental placed on Plaintiffs Exhibit #33 is not
far from the Courts determined value herein, given that asset values are often elevated in financial
statements. The values on the Exhibit 100 used by the Plaintiff to show a propensity of Defendant
to cover up the truth nevertheless suggests a value close to what the Court values the company at.
Support should be computed using Mrs. Child's average salary of $1407 per month, and Mr.
Child's $ 10,000 maximum. As an aside here, the Court notes the using the salaries alone would not
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reach the $10,000 maximum but including incomefromthe bonuses which this Court is determining
are continuing as well as incomefromthe Dave and Cathy Business, Ifindthe maximum exceeded.
The $ 1400 monthly amount should be shared proportionately. If my computations are correct this
means 12% or $168 for Cathy and 88% or $1232 for Dave. Under the temporary order filed April
22, 2003 the Court Ordered Mr. Child to pay $1050 as and for support for the two children. The
Court has concluded that Mr. Child has access to substantially greater resources and income than
originally used to compute the child support in this case. I reserved the right to adjust the original
figure at the time of the hearing and believe that such an adjustment is warranted. Therefore, the
monthly difference of $182 should be credited to Mrs. Child's ledger for the monthsfrom7/15/02
until the modification of the custody order. While both children were with Mr. Child, Mrs. Child
should pay the $168.00 monthly allocation. Or in other words the $168.00 should go on Mr. Child's
side of the ledger. Now that one child is living with each parent a new computation needs to be
prepared and I leave this to Counsel to prepare. The proportionate adjustment to each party's ledger
need be made of course. I choose not to order make up visitations as requested by Respondent in
closing argument due to the changes in custody we are exploring. I reserve the right to do so at a
later date.
The Court also ordered the Respondent to pay as temporary alimony the sum of $2500 per
month again from the date offilingthe petition herein. I again reserved the right to make adjustments
in that amount after trial. I conclude that an adjustment is warranted, both on the basis of Mrs.
Child's needs and Mr. Child's ability to pay. I have been using gross figures for purposes of
determining support, but for purposes of alimony a net figure is required. But even giving a wide
berth for state and federal income taxes, social security etc., I conclude that Mr. Child has available
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to him on a gross monthly basis an amount equal to the average gross monthly earnings (including
bonuses)

for the 1996 through 1999 period previously alluded to herein, to wit: $11530

approximately. Subtracting the $1232 support leaves a balance of $10300 approximately again.
Reducing this figure by 50% which I deem generous to account for Social Security taxes, State and
Federal with holding taxes and a generous return on investment (I don't want to kill the goose that
lays the golden egg) leaves a balance of some $5150.00 which if divided in half gives Mrs. Child
alimony of $2575.00. Even the combination of her attributed earnings, support and alimony only
reaches $5214.00 not the $7217 that her exhibit 73 outlined she needed, but which seemed excessive
to this Court, but I believe it is a reasonable amount to be awarded as alimony herein.
The Court believes that a final admonition is appropriate here. I have not been happy with
both parties' good faith efforts to comply with this Courts interim orders, specifically, and most
recently, Mr. Child's circumvention of the Courts order limiting the amount ofmoney to be expended
for the birthday gift (car) for the eldest boy. I believe that he allowed and tacitly, if not explicitly,
approved the circumvention of my Order and Mrs. Child's express protestations. I find this most
distressing and a continuation of the "blame game" that both parties are using to the detriment of the
children. Mrs. Child's ignoring the Court's Order when it suited her and loudly complaining about
Mr. Child's noncompliance when that suited her also suggests a disrespect of a very similar kind and
degree. I contemplated imposition of some sanctions, but fear that to do so would place me in the
"blame game" that continues with the custody/visitation battle that continues. In hopes that this will
serve as an example to the parents, I am reserving the right to sometime in the future impose
sanctions, preferring to let the parties contemplate what those sanctions will be, and hoping that their
contemplation will favorably impact their decisions involving these two wonderful (by ALL reports)
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Each party shall pay their own costs, expenses, expert fees, and attorneys fees.
Mrs. White shall prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree, accordingly.

Dated this 21st day of March, 2006.

J4#C£~>&s*
Bruce K. Halliday, District Judge
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ADDENDUM 2

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CATHY CHILD,
Supplemental Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law
Petitioner,

vs
DAVID N. CHILD,
Respondent.

Case No. 024700194
Judge Bruce K. Halliday

The above matter came on for trial on March 7-10,2005; May 10-13, 2005; June
2-3, 2005 and June 6-7, 2005. On each of said trial dates, Petitioner was personally
present and represented by her attorney, Rodney R. Parker and Respondent was
personally present and represented by his attorney, Joane Pappas White. The Court had
previously granted a Motion to Bifurcate, found grounds for divorce and signed and
entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce on December 27,
2004. The Court reserved for trial all of the remaining issues raised by the pleadings. At
the conclusion of the trial, the Court received written closing arguments from each of the
parties, took the matter under advisement and, having been fully advised in the premises
and having considered all of the above, the Court finds as follows:
Supplemental Findings of Fact
RESERVED ISSUES
1. Since the conclusion of the various trial dates in this matter, additional circumstances have
occurred and pleadings have been filed which raise new issues of custody and/or visitation
which were not presented to this Court during the trial.
2. The Court has entered temporary orders concerning those new issues based upon the
recommendations of the children's guardian ad litem Connie Mower and their therapist, Dr.
Matt Davies. Pursuant to those temporary orders, the parties were granted the joint legal
custody of their two minor sons. The Petitioner was awarded the physical custody of the
oldest son, Jason Child, born October 26,1989. The Respondent was awarded the physical
custody of the youngest son Justin Child, born October 4,1991. Visitation was ordered to
occur on a schedule as determined by said guardian and therapist in the best interests of the
children.

3. However, the Court reserves the new matters, which address custodial changes and/or
visitation arrangements, for further decision on an ad hoc basis, as circumstances may require,
to sometime in the future, so as not to cause additional delay in deciding the limited custodial,
visitation, property, alimony and support matters originally sought in the divorce case.
4. The Court finds that it is appropriate to make it's ruling on the remaining issues in the
divorce case based upon the evidence it received during trial. Therefore, the Court now
proceeds to decide the balance of the case on the evidence as originally presented at trial.
5. Because of this decision, the Court chooses not to order makeup visits as requested by
Respondent in his closing argument but the Court will reserve the right to do so at a later
date, depending on the outcome of the new custodial/visitation issues.
PROPERTY ISSUES
OVERVIEW OF FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE COURT IN ITS PROPERTY
DISTRIBUTION
6. In fashioning its property distribution, the Court considered numerous factors, as well
as the interrelationship of those factors upon each other. The Court finds the following:
A. The Petitioner's theory essentially was that everything acquired by the
parties since their marriage was, and is, marital property, including a 100 percent
interest in A-1 Rental and Lawn Equipment, Inc., a Utah "C" corporation (called A-1
Rental, Inc. hereafter).
B. The Respondent's theory was somewhat different, to wit, that the only marital
property was the property that the parties acquired in the Dave and Cathy Rental
Business and their home property and its contents. His theory was that his prior wife
Sharon and his father Neil Child had started A-1 Rental and Lawn Equipment, Inc. in
the early 1980's. That Neil had contributed $15,000 and received a 75% ownership
interest and Sharon and Dave contributed $5,000 and received a 25% ownership
interest in the corporation. Dave testified that he was awarded the 25% interest in his
divorce from Sharon and immediately sold one half of same, namely 12 1/2%, to his
brother Brad Child prior the Dave's marriage to Cathy. Respondent argued that his
shares in A-1 Rental, Inc. were his sole and separate property which he owned at the
time of his marriage to the Petitioner and that said interest, and its appreciated value,
were not marital assets.
C. Because both parties proceeded through the entire trial on the basis of their
underlying theories, the Court has enormous amounts of information which do not
materially assist the Court in making the necessary distributions or in keeping with the
theory which the Court believes the evidence supports.
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D. Since the evidence does not easily break out from either parties' exhibits,
some extrapolation and considerable weighing of the testimony of one side against the
other side, is necessary to reach an appropriate and sustainable decision relative to
the multitudinous claims raised by the parties herein.
E. The Court finds that it should proceed to divide any and all of the properties
in a way that avoids the necessity of any long continuing contact between Mr. and Mrs.
Child while they are attempting to work out final details.
F. In this light, the Court has decided to award many of the individual contested
property items to A-1 Rental, Inc. and/or Mr. Child and to give to Mrs. Child an
offsetting award in the form of an amount of alimony that will allow her to rent similar
items. Instead of owning some of the various recreation or equipment items, and
having the expense of maintaining them during their limited use, Petitioner can rent
them and continue a reasonably close living situation to that which existed prior to the
separation of the parties.
G. Further, this Court finds that Mr. Child is in the position of being able to
better provide such a standard of living for Mrs. Child in the form of alimony if the
business properties remain essentially within his ownership and/or the ownership of his
father's business.
H. Additionally, there was some testimony during the course of the proceedings
which suggested that Mr. Child's father intended to use the A-1 Rental, Inc. corporate
structure as a method of distributing to his heirs some of the munificence of his various
business efforts. The Court believes that the procedure outlined herein interferes with
such plans in the most minimal fashion.
THE INTEREST IN A-1 RENTAL, INC.
7. As indicated above, the Petitioner argued that all of A-1 Rental, Inc. was owned by
Respondent and all of it was marital. The Court finds and concludes that the Petitioner
failed to prove her theory by a preponderance of the evidence.
8. As indicated above, the Respondent argued that his father had always owned 75% of
A-1 Rental, Inc. and the Respondent had owned 25% but that Respondent sold 121/a% of
said corporation to his brother Brad Child shortly before Respondent's marriage to the
Petitioner. The Court finds and concludes that the Respondent failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that A-1 Rental, Inc. was entirely premarital property or that
he only owned a 12 1/2% interest in A-1 Rental, Inc.
9. Respondent has not convinced the Court by a preponderance of the evidence of his
claimed sale of half of his 25 percent interest. The failure to execute the necessary
documents to establish any such conveyance of interest, the Court finds compelling. The
receipt of monies from a brother for the purposes that Respondent alleged, were to be
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accomplished smacks, to this Court, more of a loan than a sale of a property interest. The
claim of a transfer of interest, coming after the separation of the parties, combined with the
Petitioner's response to that alleged claim, and finally, the response of other family
members to that claim confirms in this Court's mind that the Respondent again has failed
in carrying his burden to establish the ownership interests claimed. The Court therefore
finds and concludes that at the time of the marriage, the Respondent owned a 25 percent
interest in the A-l Rental, Inc. business and that he continues to own a 25 percent interest
in that business.
10. The Court does not find that the Petitioner established Respondent's ownership of
100% of A-1 Rental, Inc., but only a 25% interest which should be divided equally between
the parties.
11. The Court further concludes that any and all increases from the date of the marriage in
the value of said 25 percent interest was, and is, an increase in the marital estate in the
same proportional basis as the original ownership.
VALUATION OF THE INTEREST IN A-1 RENTAL
12. The valuation of A-1 Rental, Inc. and the equipment and/or "Blue Sky" for that
business is a matter of great concern to this Court and an extremely difficult matter to
value under these circumstances.
13. As indicated above, the Court has ordered that some of the properties claimed by Mrs.
Child be returned to owners other than Mr. and Mrs. Child individually. However, some of
the values of those items, specifically the Haulmark Trailer being returned to the A-l
business, would reasonably increase the value of the business at least by the amount of
the value of that trailer, which is some $6,500 if Petitioner's appraiser is to be believed.
14. However, again the Court did not find much of the evidence helpful in making a
determination of what this minority interest in a small, but closely-held family corporation,
should fetch on the open market.
15. Clearly, the Court has determined that whatever the value, the first $5,000 should be
returned to Mr. Child as premarital property. This Court cannot see how the A-1 Rental
business is worth as much proportionately to this marriage as the Dave and Cathy Rental
Business due mainly to the fact that the A-1 interest is a minority interest.
16. From the testimony, the Court finds that there are really no barriers to entry into this
type of business and very little value to the licenses which are held by the business. The
gross appraised values of A-1 Rental, Inc. suggested by the parties would necessarily
have to be discounted by the cost of selling same and some consideration for
transportation of the equipment and for the tax consequences of a bulk sale have all
convinced this Court that the reasonable market value of the whole company approximates
the sum of $960,000, making Mrs. Child's one-eighth interest worth $120,000.
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17. The Court believes that Mr. Child had a good grasp on the value of the various assets
and was impressed with the completeness of the inventories and his description (both
good and bad) of the various items.
18. Even considering the items which the Court has returned to A-1 Rental, the Court
believes the above values are reasonable, especially considering the uncertainty of market
conditions alluded to by the parties.
19. All of the foregoing evaluations, the Court believes are equalized/modified and/or
mitigated by this Court's determination of Mr. Child's earning ability and what the Court has
alluded to as the somewhat "generous" nature thereof.
20. It may be appropriate to note here that the Court has purposefully not made provision
for sales fees on the home nor income tax consequences on the sale of any of the other
properties disposed of herein because the Court has concluded that the decision to sell
rather than divide property should be left up to the parties and they are best positioned to
minimize those consequences.
21. Nevertheless if complete liquidation is needed each will have to again pay their fair
share. The Court also wishes to point out that the value of A-1 Rental placed on
Petitioner's Exhibit #33 is not far from the Court's determined value herein, given that asset
values are often elevated in financial statements. The values on the Exhibit 100, used by
the Petitioner to show a propensity of Defendant to cover up the truth, nevertheless
suggests a value close to what the Court values the company at.

THE DAVE AND CATHY RENTAL BUSINESS
22. The Court has previously indicated that it believed that the Dave and Cathy Rental
Business real estate, accounts and machinery acquisitions were, and are, 100 percent
marital property and should be divided on an equal basis since the marriage was of long
duration and both parties contributed to the growth of the marital estate in essentially equal
parts.
23. With respect to the rental real estate owned by the parties as part of the assets of the
Dave and Cathy Rental Business, the Court awards the rental properties referred to as the
"Harmond Property" and "Second South Property" to Mr. Child at the appraised values
stipulated to by the parties, to wit: $87,000 and $115,000.
24. The Court finds that Mrs. Child shall be given a credit in her column for one half of said
value which is $101,000.
25. The Court finds that the Zions' Rental Business Account #48-472419 was, and is, in
fact, the Dave and Cathy Rental Business Account and was in the approximate amount of
$60,257 and some cents, on or about February of 2005. The testimony was to the effect
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that Mr. Child subsequently removed some monies from this account to assist him in
payment of his living expenses, all of which was without this Court's permission and should
be, on that basis alone, disallowed. Mr. Child is ordered to return to the account any
monies taken from this account for personal use, including any payments on the Corvette
previously determined to be a gift. He is further ordered to pay into this account from A-1
Rental, Inc., any rental monies due and owing for the use of the Dave and Cathy Child
rental properties. The account, after those payments are put in, but after removing any and
all necessary expenses, such as taxes and insurances on the family properties and any
and all legitimate maintenance costs, etc., should be divided equally between these two
parties. It is, of course, the Court's intention that those amounts from this account
authorized in hearings after the conclusion of trial for the payment of counseling and
professional advice concerning the children and regarding the custodial problems be
subtracted and attributed equally to the parties.
26. The Court does not deal with valuing any of the Dave and Cathy's rental business
equipment and/or depreciated assets. The Court finds and concludes that those assets of
the Dave and Cathy Rental Business should be sold and distributed to the parties on an
equal basis. Since both parties have had the benefit of the depreciated assets during the
marriage, each should share equally now.

THE DAVE AND CATHY HOME AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
27. Both parties seem to agree that the home was, and is, marital property and must
necessarily be equally divided and distributed by the Court.
28. The Court finds that the personal residence/home located at 1406 West Sage Circle in
Wellington, Utah should be awarded to the Petitioner, free and clear of any claim by the
Respondent thereon. The Court values the same at $350,000, pursuant to the various
testimonies of the parties and/or appraisers, none of whom seem to have necessarily
considered all of the factors which the Court deems necessary to be considered. If they did
consider the factors, they gave what the Court believes to be inappropriate weight thereto
and distorted the values.
29. The Court finds that Mr. Child shall be given a credit in his column for one half of said
value which is $175,000.
30. The Court does not want to become bogged down in making a division of the various
individual assets acquired and accumulated by the parties and, therefore, except for a few
separate items which the Court hereafter specifically refers to, it is the intention of the
Court that any and all items not specifically disposed of herein, and which were listed in
either party's exhibits or closing arguments as co-owned, should be divided on a 50/50
basis, by the method outlined in Respondent's closing argument, namely, an alternating
selection process to occur at the marital residence under the supervision of counsel or an
agreed third party, immediately upon the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The Court
concludes that first choice should be given to Mrs. Child and then alternating choices made
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by the parties for any and all of the remaining items. The Court believes that as the items
become less valuable, it may be helpful for the parties to choose two, three, five, or ten at
a time and then alternate those two, three, five, or ten at a time choices. The individually
owned items listed by Respondent for he and Petitioner in his closing argument are
confirmed as individually owned, to-wit:
To Cathy:
1 glass and wood table and lamps
King size waterbed and dresser and nightstand
Old Consol TV Wood Cathy's
Cathy's personal belongings stored in basement at the rental property
To Dave:
15-20 piece ceramic village from Dave's Mother
Dave's Motorcycle boots—Alpine Star
Water Skis
Dave's snowmobile helmet in trailer
Dave's snowmobile boots I trailer
Three garbage sacks in the garage filled with Dave's clothing
Dave's trophies
Dave's marble telephone from Italy
2 boxes of misc. Kiwanis banners
Christmas Town that goes with ceramic village
Decorations from the Hall closet upstairs
Dave's snowmobile suit
Little giant ladder model 10203
Grandmother's dresser for Dave's daughter
Copies of all photos of the children in the marital residence
$4500 investment in Central Bank Corporate Stock

31. The foregoing is altered by the Court's decision to award to A-1 Rental, Inc. all of the
personal properties listed by Mr. Child as belonging to that corporation. As indicated later,
this decision, to some extent, mitigates the somewhat "generous" amount of salary the
Court has used for Mr. Child in the computations made herein. The property being
returned to A-1 Rental is as follows:
Church Table
Mac Tool Box and the tools contained therein
Workbench—air lift
5 boxes full of 2.5 gallon plastic gas cans
8' aluminum ramp
1 fluorescent work light
Haulmark 25' trailer Serial # 23268
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5 gallon propane tank with heater
Fluorescent work light (additional work light)
Battery charger
Riding lawn mower Honda 3013
Honda HRB215HXA lawn mower
Honda Trimmer UMK431LTA
Honda snow thrower HS621
Honda F401A1 Tiller
Appliance Dolly
32. The parties have had their own vehicles during the course of the marriage and,
although they had access to each other's vehicles, the Court awards the 1999 Chevy
Suburban to the Petitioner and the 2000 Ford F350 pickup truck to the Respondent. In
addition, the evidence convinces the Court that the 2002 Corvette was, in fact, a gift to the
Respondent and it should be his sole and separate property, subject to any debt thereon,
which should be paid by Respondent.
33. The jewelry presently in the Petitioner's possession also was a gift to the Petitioner
and should be her exclusive separate property.
34. The Court concludes that the 22' Bayliner boat with the trailer is owned 50 percent by
these parties as a marital asset and 50% by third persons. The value for the boat should
be established at $8,000 and the parties' marital interest is one half of that amount or
$4000. The boat itself should be awarded to the Respondent and a credit for one fourth of
the total value, to wit: $2,000, should be a credit in the Petitioner's column.
35. The Court cannot conclude from the evidence that the parties hereto have any
ownership interest in the 32' Bayliner boat, trailer and it's accessories and orders the same
be returned to Blue Water Marine immediately.
36. The Court chooses not to make any distribution of the Honda XR70, XR80, XR100,
which were allegedly property of the children.
37. In attempting to address all of the various issues raised in the various hearings, the
Court is going to use the marital assets schedule attached as the last page of closing
arguments by Petitioner's attorney to hopefully address most of the assets which the Court
wishes to address individually.
38. With respect to the balance of the bank accounts, the Court concludes that the $800 in
account #291 is a marital asset and should be divided equally between the parties. The
$8500 in Account #441 does appear to be the remainder of Mrs. Child's share of the
monies that the Court divided under its April 22, 2003 Order on Order to Show Cause and
belongs to her. The $2000 allegedly in the safe at the personal residence is also marital
property and should be divided equally. The $4500 investment in Central Bank Corporate
Stock, the parties agree, is the sole and separate property of David and should be
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awarded to him free and clear of any claim by the Petitioner thereon. If any of the foregoing
accounts has been reduced, the party having possession of the asset or the passbook
shall be charged with that possession and must make up the difference.
39. The retirement accounts for each of the parties should be awarded as indicated in the
Petitioner's document so that $10,384 of Ms. Child's retirement be awarded to her as sole
and separate property acquired before the marriage and that the remaining $34,896 be
awarded to her as her share of the property acquired during the marriage. The $33,867
which was acquired during the marriage by David Child should be awarded to him as the
two retirements acquired during the marriage essentially offset each other.
40. The Time Share in Mazatlan, the Court awards to the Respondent and places no
value thereon, but it requires him to pay any and all arrearages or at least to terminate the
property interest with no financial burden to the Petitioner herein.
41. The various adult toys, not designated as belonging to the children of these parties,
should be placed in the property lists to be divided by the parties themselves by making
individual alternating choices as provided for herein.
42. The Court believes that the David Child furnishings estimated at a $5,000 value should
not be considered marital assets of this marriage, the same having been acquired after the
separation of the parties and using Mr. Child's income. Those items are awarded to Mr.
Child as sole and separate property.
43. The Haulmark trailer, alluded to in Petitioner's exhibit, the Court cannot determine to
be owned by the parties and therefore orders the same to be returned to and become part
of the inventory of A-1 Rental, Inc. This finding should also apply to the large tool box at
the residence and the floor lift at the residence. Said items are to be returned immediately.
44. Finally, any tax refunds received, or to be received, should be designated to be marital
property and should be divided equally between these two parties up to the year this Court
granted the Divorce in the Bifurcated hearing. The same may be necessary going forward
depending upon how the parties file their income tax returns prior to the effective date of
their divorce.
INCOME AND SUPPORT ISSUES
45. Clearly, all of the monies which this family generated, together with all of the
perquisites, tax benefits, and property benefits which the various businesses generated,
provided this family with a superior standard of living which this Court should attempt to
see that both parties can continue, given their financial talents.
46. Using salaries and bonuses avoids, to some extent, the complications spawned by the
parties' efforts to configure their income and values placed on the various properties to
each of their own advantage and/or the disadvantage of the opposing party. It also gives to
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the Court the latitude necessary to make an equitable division of the properties and/or
incomes of the parties to provide for a standard of living consistent with the standard of
living developed overjbje period of this marriage.
DAVE'S INCOME
47. It is the Court's fed* that the salary and bonuses paid to David Child during the earlier
period of time is really in fact representative of the amounts necessary to pay for a lifestyle
similar to that which Mr. and Ms. Child enjoyed during the course of their marriage, up to
and including, the present time. The Court has, in an attempt to make the determination as
equitable as possible, averaged the salary which Mr. Child admitted for each of those four
years, along with the bonuses for each of those four years, and has taken an average of
the salary plus the bonuses and the Court believes that it is representative of the income
needed to pay for the lifestyle which the Childs lived.
48. It appears obvious to this Court that the Respondent has always obtained substantial
monetary and/or other gains from the equipment rental business substantially greater than
any specific salary or bonus paid. The access to boats, trailers, various water craft and/or
four-wheel all terrain vehicles, trailers for transporting same, as well as mechanical
equipment, tools and the like were perquisites of significant value. They are properties
which Respondent claims were always owned by A-1 Rental and, if the Court agrees,
would reduce some of the assets distributable as marital property. But, clearly they are
evidence of the lifestyle this family was able to enjoy through their common efforts during
this marriage.
49. It is extremely difficult for the Court to place values upon the use of equipment.
50. The ability to avoid, if not evade, tax liabilities in a closely-held corporation situated as
this company is, creates exceptionally difficult valuation problems also. I believe that for
purposes of dividing the properties and allocating support and/or alimony monies, the four
years of salary and bonus payments made to Mr. Child during 1996,1997,1998 and 1999
create the best baseline for making those decisions of any and all the evidence proposed
by the parties. Those amounts would be $79,600, $130,680, $121,600, and $221,600
respectively making a total of $553,480 which, when divided by the four years, makes an
average yearly salary of $138,370 and an average gross monthly salary of $11,530, which
this Court finds is representative of the actual monies and/or benefits which the parties had
available to them from Mr. Child's efforts.
CATHY'S INCOME
51. Similarly, the years of 1994,1995,1996 and 1997, the last years worked by Mrs.
Child, reflect her contributions monetarily to the family, her earning ability and the
approximate amount she will need to contribute going forward.

10

52. As indicated earlier, the Court believes that the years of 1994 through 1997 represent
the approximate average cash contribution which Cathy Child made during the course of
the marriage and also is representative of the income which is or should be available and
therefore attributable to Mrs. Child in the computations of alimony and/or support. Those
amounts, pursuant to Exhibit #37, are $12,376; $21,689; $22,584; and $10,920, making an
average yearly contribution of $16,892.25, or $1407 monthly. The Court concludes that this
monthly average should be the amount attributable to Mrs. Child in making computations
of child support and/or alimony.
53. When the Court first became involved in this case at the original Order to Show Cause
hearing, the disparity between the parties' contentions was evident. As the matter has
progressed, the disparity has only increased. The Court attempted at that time, to indicate
to the parties, that it has been the Court's experience that when two people divorce there
never is enough money to really put the parties in the exact same position as they were in
during the marriage. It has been the Court's experience that there was not enough money
while they were living together and, when they take on two homes instead of one, and
essentially two of everything instead of one, the money does not stretch far enough. The
Court suggested at that original hearing that Mrs. Child would have to return to the
workforce some place along the line in order to continue the standard of living which she
desired. It is the Court's continuing conclusion that this will be necessary.
54. It further appears that Ms. Child has attempted to prepare herself for better
employment and that Mr. Child has assisted her in doing this with the temporary alimony
payments paid under the original temporary order.
55. The Court further concludes that the nine years that the respondent has not been
employed, but during which she assisted in the business, took care of the home, took care
of the children, and most recently has attempted to improve her employability through her
educational efforts, essentially supported by Mr. Child, and especially after the issuance of
the Temporary Order herein, exhausts any requirement that Mr. Child assist Mrs. Child in
her relocation and/or re-employment training. Mr. Child should therefore not be required to
pay for any additional education and/or improvement of skills for Mrs. Child and she should
attempt to re-enter the job market at the highest salary possible at this time.
CHILD SUPPORT
56. These average amounts place the income of the parties above the statutory maximum
of $10,000 per month upon which to base the support payments pursuant to the Statutory
Guidelines and, therefore, justify the Court in ordering the support payments be set in the
amount of $1400 per month until the first child reaches the age of eighteen, at which time
the support should decrease pursuant to the statutory scheme.
57. The Court believes that by attributing to Mr. and Mrs. Child the foregoing income on an
annual basis and carrying same forward for a period of time essentially equal to the term of
this marriage, which the Court defines as 15 years (beginning with the date of the marriage
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on July 10,1987 and terminating with the filing of the petition herein on July 15, 2002),
provides the necessary resource for the support and alimony awarded herein.
58. Support should be computed using Mrs. Child's average salary of $1407 per month,
and Mr. Child's $10,000 maximum. As an aside here, the Court notes that using the
salaries alone would not reach the $10,000 maximum but including income from the
bonuses which this Court is determining are continuing, as well as income from the Dave
and Cathy Business, I find the maximum exceeded. The $1400 monthly amount should be
shared proportionately. If the Court's computations are correct this means 12% or $168 for
Cathy and 88% or $1232 for Dave.
59. Under the temporary order filed April 22, 2003 the Court Ordered Mr. Child to pay
$1050 as and for support for the two children. The Court has concluded that Mr. Child has
access to substantially greater resources and income than originally used to compute the
child support in this case. The Court reserved the right to adjust the original figure at the
time of the hearing and believes that such an adjustment is warranted. Therefore, the
monthly difference of $182 should be credited to Mrs. Child's ledger for the months from
7/15/02 until the modification of the custody order.
60. While both children were with Mr. Child, Mrs. Child should pay the $168.00 monthly
allocation. In other words the $168.00 should go on Mr. Child's side of the ledger. The
proportionate adjustment to each party's column needs be made of course. Now that one
child is living with each parent, a new computation needs to be prepared and the Court
leaves this to counsel to prepare new child support calculations for inclusion in the
temporary orders now governing the children's issues.
ALIMONY
61. The period of Mr. Child's employment that appears to be most relevant to the Court's
deliberations in this matter were the years 1996 through 1999 inclusive when Mr. Child
was paid extra monies for the extra efforts that he undertook on behalf of A-1 Rental, Inc.
During this period, monies were generated sufficient to pay a greater level of
compensation and, at the same time, accumulate various equipment so that the major
investor, Mr. Child's father, was comfortable in the increase in the value of his business as
a return on his investment.
62. The salary history of Cathy, which the court has used in forecasting her earnings, was
for the period 1994 through 1997, the last four years that she was employed. The Court
has not increased or decreased either party's salary by the amounts of monies earned or
lost in the Dave and Cathy Rental Business. All of those monies appear to have been
used by the parties in improving their lifestyle or increasing the value of their business
through the purchase and/or the improvement of equipment or real estate. It does not
appear to be, at this point in time, a source of income for either of the parties since the
Court has concluded that the assets of the Dave and Cathy Rental Business should be
sold and distributed to the parties on an equal basis.
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63. The Court also ordered the Respondent to pay as temporary alimony, the sum of
$2500 per month again from the date of filing the petition herein. The Court again reserved
the right to make adjustments in that amount after trial. The Court concludes that an
adjustment is warranted, both on the basis of Mrs. Child's needs and Mr. Child's ability to
pay. The Court has been using gross figures for purposes of determining child support, but
for purposes of alimony, a net figure is required. But even giving a wide berth for state and
federal income taxes, social security etc., the Court finds that Mr. Child has available to
him on a gross monthly basis, an amount equal to the average gross monthly earnings
(including bonuses) for the 1996 through 1999 period previously alluded to herein, to wit:
$11,530 approximately.
64. Subtracting the $1232 child support figure leaves a balance of $10300 approximately
again. Reducing this figure by 50%, which the Court deems generous to account for Social
Security taxes, State and Federal with holding taxes and a generous return on investment
(the Court does not want to kill the goose that lays the golden egg), leaves a balance of
some $5150.00 which, if divided in half, gives Mrs. Child alimony of $2575.00. Even the
combination of her attributed earnings, support and alimony only reaches $5214.00 not the
$7217 that her exhibit 73 outlined she needed, but which seemed excessive to this Court.
The Court believes $2575 was a reasonable amount to be awarded as alimony herein and
orders alimony adjusted to that amount from July 15, 2002 to the present.

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
65. At the time of the original temporary hearing, the Court divided a substantial family
savings account equally between the parties. Each party had approximately $18-20,000
as a result of that division from which to retain attorneys and pay costs. Each party
additionally could anticipate a substantial property distribution free and clear of debt
because the parties' assets were basically unencumbered. The Court finds that each party
had cash and assets to allow for legal representation and had the ability to select and enter
into contracts with their respective attorneys. The Court finds that each party should be
ordered to pay his or her own costs, expenses, expert fees, and attorney's fees in this
matter.
ADMONITION
66. The Court believes that a final admonition is appropriate here. The Court has not been
happy with either party's good faith efforts to comply with this Court's interim orders.
Specifically, and most recently, Mr. Child circumvented the Court's order limiting the
amount of money to be expended for the birthday gift (car) for the eldest boy. The Court
believes that he allowed and tacitly, if not explicitly, approved the circumvention of the
Order and Mrs. Child's express protestations. The Court finds this most distressing and a
continuation of the "blame game" that both parties are using to the detriment of the
children. Mrs. Child has ignored this Court's orders when it suited her, and loudly
complained about Mr. Child's noncompliance when that suited her also. Such conduct
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suggests a disrespect of the Court's orders of a very similar kind and degree as that of Mr.
Child.
67. The Court contemplated imposition of some sanctions but fears that to do so would
place the Court in the "blame game" that continues with the custody/visitation battle that
continues. In hopes that this will serve as an example to the parents, the Court is reserving
the right to, sometime in the future, impose sanctions. The Court prefers to let the parties
contemplate what those sanctions might be and hopes that their contemplation will
favorably impact their decisions involving these two wonderful (by ALL reports) boys.

The Court, having entered the foregoing Supplemental Findings of Fact, now
concludes as follows:
SUPPLEMENTAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Court confirms and continues its Temporary Orders granting joint legal custody of the
two minor children to the parties. The Petitioner is granted physical custody of the parties'
eldest son, Jason Child, born October 26,1989 and the Respondent is granted physical
custody of the parties' youngest son, Justin Child, born October 4, 1991. Visitation is ordered
to occur on the schedule determined by the children's guardian ad litem and their therapist Dr.
Matt Davies to be in the best interests of the children. All issues concerning the children's
custody and visitation and related matters raised in the pleadings which were filed subsequent
to the trial in this matter are reserved for further decision on an ad hoc basis, as circumstances
may require, to sometime in the future, so as not to cause additional delay in deciding the
divorce case.
2. The Court reserves the right to address Respondent's request for makeup visitation at a
later date, depending on the outcome of the new custodial/visitation issues.
3. Based on the Court's ruling and adjustment of child support during the pendency of the
action, Respondent is ordered to pay to the Petitioner the additional the sum of $182 per
month, for and as adjusted child support, for the two minor children of the parties
commencing with July 15, 2002 and continuing until September 25, 2005 when both
children began living with Respondent. Respondent owes Petitioner adjusted child support
in the sum of $6825 from July 15, 2002 until the children moved in with Respondent.
4. Based on the Court's ruling and adjustment of child support while both children were
residing with the Respondent, Petitioner is ordered to pay to the Respondent, child support
in the sum of $168 per month for the two minor children of the parties, commencing
October, 2005 to the date of the March 5, 2006 hearing. Petitioner owes Respondent child
support in the sum of $840 ($168 x 5). Balancing the adjustments, Respondent owes
Petitioner $5985 in adjusted child support from July 15, 2002 to March, 2006.
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5. Commencing with March, 2006, each party has had physical custody of one child and
pursuant to the Court's determination that Petitioner's child support should be based upon
an earning capacity of $1407 per month and Respondent's child support should be based
upon an earning capacity of $10,000 per month. Counsel for the parties are ordered to
calculate ongoing child support and submit those calculations for inclusion in the
Temporary Orders currently governing the children's issues,
6. Each party is ordered to obtain and maintain medical insurance for the benefit of the
minor children of the parties when such insurance is available at reasonable cost. Each
party is ordered to pay one half of all reasonable and necessary premiums for medical
insurance and one half of all medical, dental, optical, psychological, pharmaceutical or
other health care expense incurred on behalf of the minor children which are not paid by a
policy of insurance. Each party shall pay any such uninsured expenses incurred on behalf
of the minor child in his or her physical custody. Said party shall also provide verification
to the non-physical custodial parent of payment of the uninsured expenses to the medical
provider and shall report all insurance payments applicable to the account. The
non-physical custodian shall then reimburse the physical custodian for said one half share
within 30 days of verification of payment of the expenses.
7. Respondent is ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $2575 for and as alimony
commencing with the July 15, 2002 and continuing for a period of 15 years (which the
Court deems to be the length of the marriage as outlined in the Finding of Facts) or until
the Petitioner remarries, cohabits or alimony is modified or otherwise terminated by
operation of law, whichever event occurs earlier.
8. Based on the Court's ruling and adjustment of alimony during the pendency of the
action, Respondent owes to Petitioner the additional sum of $75 per month from July 15,
2002 to September 25, 2005 for and as alimony. Respondent owes the Petitioner a total of
$2850 in adjusted alimony for said time period. However, Respondent has been paying
$2800 since October, 2005 and is entitled to a credit of $2025 ($225 x 9) through June,
2006 under the adjustment formula. After adjustments, Respondent is ordered to pay $825
to the Petitioner for the alimony adjustment from July 15, 2002 through June, 2006.
9. The Court immediately orders the return of the property of third parties to those owners
and authorizes Respondent to obtain the assistance of the Wellington City Police
department to gain access into the marital home and garages to obtain said property and
return it, if the Petitioner does not produce same upon 24 hours notice:
To A-1 Rental, Inc.:
Church Table
Mac Tool Box and the tools contained therein
Workbench—air lift
5 boxes full of 2.5 gallon plastic gas cans
8' aluminum ramp
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1 fluorescent work light
Haulmark 25' trailer Serial # 23268
5 gallon propane tank with heater
Fluorescent work light (additional work light)
Battery charger
Riding lawn mower Honda 3013
Honda HRB215HXA lawn mower
Honda Trimmer UMK431LTA
Honda snow thrower HS621
Honda F401A1 Tiller
Appliance Dolly
To Blue Water Marine, Inc.
The 32' Bayliner Boat together with its zip-in windows, all its accessories and its trailer
10. The Court does not allocate the Honda XR70, XR80, XR100 as they are the
children's property and shall be managed as such.
11. The Court does not want to become bogged down in making a division of the various
individual assets acquired and accumulated by the parties and, therefore, except for a few
separate items which the Court hereafter specifically refers to, it is the intention of the
Court that any and all items not specifically disposed of herein, and which were listed in
either party's exhibits or closing arguments as co-owned, shall be divided on a 50/50 basis,
by the method outlined in Respondent's closing argument, namely, an alternating selection
process to occur at the marital residence under the supervision of the parties' attorneys or
agreed third parties, immediately upon the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The Court
concludes that the first choice of an item should be given to Mrs. Child and the second
choice of an item to Mr. Child and then alternating choices made by the parties for any and
all of the remaining items, adult toys and personal property at the marital residence until all
of the items as listed above have been divided. The Court believes that as the items
become less valuable, it may be helpful for the parties to choose two, three, five, or ten at
a time and then alternate those two, three, five, or ten at a time choices if that will expedite
the selection process.
12. The Court awards the property of the parties' as follows, but subject to the valuations
and credits as outlined herein:
TO THE PETITIONER:
A. The residence/home of the parties located at 1406 West Sage Circle in
Wellington, Utah, free and clear of any claim by the Respondent thereon;
B. 1999 Chevy Suburban
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C. The Petitioner's jewelry
D. The Petitioner is awarded all of her retirement benefits, free and clear of any
claims of the Respondent
E. One half of the Dave & Cathy Rental Business Equipment, which the Court
orders to be immediately divided pursuant to agreement of the parties if they can
expeditiously reach an agreement thereby avoiding serious tax consequences, or placed
on the market and sold. If a sale is necessary, then each party is ordered to pay one half
of the costs of any sale and the equipment preparation and transportation costs for such a
sale, and each party is ordered to pay one half of any tax consequences incurred because
of a sale.
F. One half of the Zions' Rental Business Account #48-472419 in the approximate
amount of $60,257 as of February of 2005, augmented by the return to the account of any
monies subsequently taken from this account by Mr. Child for personal use, including any
payments on the Corvette previously determined to be a gift; and augmented by payment
into this account from A-1 Rental, Inc. of any rental monies due and owing for the use of
the Dave and Cathy Child rental properties; but reduced by subtracting all necessary
expenses, such as taxes, insurances and all legitimate maintenance costs for the family
properties and further reduced by those amounts from this account authorized by the Court
in hearings after the conclusion of trial for the payment of counseling and professional
assistance concerning the children and their custodial problems.
G. Petitioner's sole and separate property consisting of the following:
I glass and wood table and lamps
King size waterbed and dresser and nightstand
Old Consol TV Wood Cathy's
Cathy's personal belongings stored in basement at the rental property
H. A credit of $120,000 for half of the equity of the 25% A-1 Rental interest; a credit
of $101,000 for half of the equity in the Dave and Cathy Rental buildings in Price, Utah; a
credit of $2000 for the parties' half interest in the 22' Bayliner Boat and its trailer and
accessories; $400 credit for account #291; and $1000 credit for the cash in the safe at the
home.
TO THE RESPONDENT:
A. The 25% interest in A-1 Rental and Lawn Equipment, Inc., free and clear of any
claims by the Petitioner thereon;

17

B. The Dave and Cathy Business rental buildings referred to as the "Harmond
Property" and "Second South Property", in Price, Utah, free and clear of any claims by the
Petitioner thereon
C. The Respondent is awarded all of his retirement benefits, free and clear of any
claims of the Petitioner
D. 2000 Ford F-350 pickup truck
E. 2002 Corvette, subject to the indebtedness thereon
F. One half of the Dave & Cathy Rental Business Equipment, which the Court
orders to be immediately divided pursuant to agreement of the parties if they can
expeditiously reach an agreement thereby avoiding serious tax consequences, or placed
on the market and sold. If a sale is necessary, then each party is ordered to pay one half
of the costs of any sale and the equipment preparation and transportation costs for such a
sale, and each party is ordered to pay one half of any tax consequences incurred because
of a sale.
G. The parties' 50% interest in the 22' Bayliner boat, trailer and its accessories.
H. One half of the Zions' Rental Business Account #48-472419 in the approximate
amount of $60,257 as of February of 2005, augmented by the return to the account of any
monies subsequently taken from this account by Mr. Child for personal use, including any
payments on the Corvette previously determined to be a gift; and augmented by payment
into this account from A-1 Rental, Inc. of any rental monies due and owing for the use of
the Dave and Cathy Child rental properties; but reduced by subtracting all necessary
expenses, such as taxes, insurances and all legitimate maintenance costs for the family
properties and further reduced by those amounts from this account authorized by the Court
in hearings after the conclusion of trial for the payment of counseling and professional
assistance concerning the children and their custodial problems.
I. Respondent's sole and separate property consisting of the following:
15-20 piece ceramic village from Dave's Mother
Dave's Motorcycle boots—Alpine Star
Water Skis
Dave's snowmobile helmet in trailer
Dave's snowmobile boots I trailer
Three garbage sacks in the garage filled with Dave's clothing
Dave's trophies
Dave's marble telephone from Italy
2 boxes of misc. Kiwanis banners
Christmas Town that goes with ceramic village
Decorations from the Hall closet upstairs
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Dave's snowmobile suit
Little giant ladder model 10203
Grandmother's dresser for Dave's daughter
Copies of all photos of the children in the marital residence
The $4500 investment in Central Bank Corporate Stock
J. The Time Share in Mazatlan, provided that Respondent pays any and all
arrearages or at least terminates the property interest with no financial burden to the
Petitioner herein.
K. The household goods and furniture purchased by Respondent after the
separation of the parties.
L. A credit of $175,000 for Respondent's equity in the marital residence; $5000
credit for Respondent's premarital 25% interest in A-1 Rental and Lawn Equipment, Inc.;
$400 credit for account #291; and $1000 credit for the cash in the safe at the home.

13. With respect to the balance of the bank accounts, the Court concludes that the $800 in
account #291 is a marital asset and should be divided equally between the parties. The
$8500 in Account #441 is the remainder of the Petitioner's share of the monies that the
Court divided under its April 22, 2003 Order on Order to Show Cause and belongs to her.
The $2000 allegedly in the safe at the personal residence is also marital property and is
ordered divided equally. The $4500 investment in Central Bank Corporate Stock, the
parties agree, is the sole and separate property of the Respondent and is awarded to him
free and clear of any claim by the Petitioner thereon. If any of the foregoing accounts has
been reduced, the party having possession of the asset or the passbook shall be charged
with that possession and must make up the difference immediately.
14. Any tax refunds received, or to be received, are designated to be marital property and
are to be divided equally between these two parties up to the year this Court granted the
Divorce in the Bifurcated hearing. The same may be necessary going forward depending
upon how the parties file their income tax returns prior to the effective date of their divorce.
15. After the above divisions have been made as ordered herein, each party is ordered to
trade out credits against agreed items or pay the corresponding credit to the other party if
such credit is not offset.
16. Each party is ordered to pay his or her own attorney's fees, court costs and expert
witness fees.
!7. The Court has admonished the parties for their lack of good faith efforts in following
this Court's temporary orders and the Court reserves the right to, at sometime in the future,
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impose sanctions. The Court prefers to let the parties contemplate what those sanctions
might be and hopes that their contemplation will favorably impact their decisions involving
their two wonderful (by ALL reports) boys.
„ ^
y
Dated this Jafa

day of Jaae, 2006.

Judge Bruce K. Halliday
District Court Judge
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ADDENDUM 3

ORIGINAL
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CATHY CHILD,
Supplemental
Decree of Divorce
Petitioner,
VS
DAVID N. CHILD,
Respondent.

Case No. 024700194
Judge Bruce K. Halliday

The above matter came on for trial on March 7-10, 2005; May 10-13, 2005; June
2-3, 2005 and June 6-7,2005. On each of said trial dates, Petitioner was personally present
and represented by her attorney, Rodney R. Parker and Respondent was personally present
and represented by his attorney, Joane Pappas White. The Court had previously granted a
Motion to Bifurcate, found grounds for divorce and signed and entered Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce on December 27, 2004. The Court reserved for
trial all of the remaining issues raised by the pleadings. At the conclusion of the trial, the
Court received written closing arguments from each of the parties, took the matter under
advisement and, having been fully advised in the premises and having considered all of the
above, and having entered its Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now
therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows:

1. The Court confirms and continues its Temporary Orders granting joint legal custody of the
two minor children to the parties. The Petitioner is granted physical custody of the parties'
eldest son, Jason Child, born October 26,1989 and the Respondent is granted physical
custody of the parties' youngest son, Justin Child, born October 4, 1991. Visitation is
ordered to occur on the schedule determined by the children's guardian ad litem and their
therapist, Dr. Matt Davies, to be in the best interests of the children. All issues concerning the
children's custody and visitation and related matters raised in the pleadings which were filed
subsequent to the trial in this matter are reserved for further decision on an ad hoc basis, as
circumstances may require, to sometime in the future, so as not to cause additional delay in
deciding the divorce case.
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2. The Court reserves the right to address Respondent's request for makeup visitation at a
later date, depending on the outcome of the new custodial/visitation issues.
3. Based on the Court's ruling and adjustment of child support during the pendency of the
action, Respondent is ordered to pay to the Petitioner the additional the sum of $182 per
month, for and as adjusted child support, for the two minor children of the parties
commencing with July 15, 2002 and continuing until September 25, 2005 when both children
began living with Respondent. Respondent owes Petitioner adjusted child support in the
sum of $6825.
4. Based on the Court's ruling and adjustment of child support while both children were
residing with the Respondent, Petitioner is ordered to pay to the Respondent child support in
the sum of $168 per month for the two minor children of the parties, commencing October,
2005 to the date of the March 5, 2006 hearing. Petitioner owes Respondent adjusted child
support in the sum of $840 ($168 x 5). Balancing the adjustments, Respondent owes
Petitioner $5985 in adjusted child support from July 15, 2002 to March, 2006.
5. Commencing with March, 2006, each party has had physical custody of one child and
pursuant to the Court's determination that Petitioner's child support should be based upon an
earning capacity of $1407 per month and Respondent's child support should be based upon
an earning capacity of $10,000 per month. Counsel for the parties are ordered to calculate
ongoing child support and submit those calculations for inclusion in the Temporary Orders
currently governing the children's issues,
6. Each party is ordered to obtain and maintain medical insurance for the benefit of the
minor children of the parties when such insurance is available at reasonable cost. Each
party is ordered to pay one half of all reasonable and necessary premiums for medical
insurance and one half of all medical, dental, optical, psychological, pharmaceutical or other
health care expense incurred on behalf of the minor children which are not paid by a policy of
insurance. Each party shall pay any such uninsured expenses incurred on behalf of the
minor child in his or her physical custody. Said party shall also provide verification to the
non-physical custodial parent of payment of the uninsured expenses to the medical provider
and shall report all insurance payments applicable to the account. The non-physical
custodian shall then reimburse the physical custodian for said one half share within 30 days
of verification of payment of the expenses.
7. Respondent is ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $2575 for and as alimony
commencing with the July 15, 2002 and continuing for a period of 15 years (which the Court
deems to be the length of the marriage as outlined in the Finding of Facts) or until the
Petitioner remarries, cohabits or alimony is modified or otherwise terminated by operation of
law, whichever event occurs earlier.
8. Based on the Court's ruling and adjustment of alimony during the pendency of the action,
Respondent owes to Petitioner the additional sum of $75 per month from July 15, 2002 to
September 25, 2005 for and as alimony. Respondent owes the Petitioner $2850 in adjusted
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alimony for said time period. Respondent has been paying $2800 since October, 2005 and
is entitled to a credit of $2025 ($225 x 9) through June, 2006 under the adjustment formula.
Respondent is ordered to pay $825 to the Petitioner for the adjusted alimony from July 15,
2002 through June, 2006.
9. The Court immediately orders the return of the property of third parties to those and
authorizes Respondent to obtain the assistance of the Wellington City Police department to
gain access into the marital home and garages to obtain said property and return it, if the
Petitioner does not produce same upon 24 hours notice:
To A-1 Rental, Inc.:
Church Table
Mac Tool Box and the tools contained therein
Workbench—air lift
5 boxes full of 2.5 gallon plastic gas cans
8' aluminum ramp
1 fluorescent work light
Haulmark 25' trailer Serial # 23268
5 gallon propane tank with heater
Fluorescent work light (additional work light)
Battery charger
Riding lawn mower Honda 3013
Honda HRB215HXA lawn mower
Honda Trimmer UMK431LTA
Honda snow thrower HS621
Honda F401A1 Tiller
Appliance Dolly
To Blue Water Marine, Inc.
The 32' Bayliner Boat together with its zip-in windows, all its accessories and its trailer
10. The Court does not allocate the Honda XR70, XR80, XR100 as they are the children's
property and shall be managed as such.
11. The Court does not want to become bogged down in making a division of the various
individual assets acquired and accumulated by the parties and, therefore, except for a few
separate items which the Court hereafter specifically refers to, it is the intention of the Court
that any and all items not specifically disposed of herein, and which were listed in either
party's exhibits or closing arguments as co-owned, shall be divided on a 50/50 basis, by the
method outlined in Respondent's closing argument, namely, an alternating selection process
to occur at the marital residence under the supervision of the parties' attorneys or agreed
third parties, immediately upon the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The Court concludes that
the first choice of an item should be given to Mrs. Child and the second choice of an item to
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Mr. Child and then alternating choices made by the parties for any and all of the remaining
items, adult toys and personal property until all of the items as listed above have been
divided. The Court believes that as the items become less valuable, it may be helpful for the
parties to choose two, three, five, or ten at a time and then alternate those two, three, five, or
ten at a time choices if that will expedite the selection process.
12. The Court awards the property of the parties' as follows, but subject to the valuations
and credits as outlined herein:
TO THE PETITIONER:
A. The residence/home of the parties located at 1406 West Sage Circle in Wellington,
Utah, free and clear of any claim by the Respondent thereon;
B. 1999 Chevy Suburban
C. The Petitioner's jewelry
D. The Petitioner is awarded all of her retirement benefits, free and clear of any
claims of the Respondent
E. One half of the Dave & Cathy Rental Business Equipment, which the Court orders
to be immediately divided pursuant to agreement of the parties if they can expeditiously
reach an agreement thereby avoiding serious tax consequences, or placed on the market
and sold. If a sale is necessary, then each party is ordered to pay one half of the costs of
any sale and the equipment preparation and transportation costs for such a sale, and each
party is ordered to pay one half of any tax consequences incurred because of a sale.
F. One half of the Zions' Rental Business Account #48-472419 in the approximate
amount of $60,257 as of February of 2005, augmented by the return to the account of any
monies subsequently taken from this account by Mr. Child for personal use, including any
payments on the Corvette previously determined to be a gift; and augmented by payment
into this account from A-1 Rental, Inc. of any rental monies due and owing for the use of the
Dave and Cathy Child rental properties; but reduced by subtracting all necessary expenses,
such as taxes, insurances and all legitimate maintenance costs for the family properties and
further reduced by those amounts from this account authorized by the Court in hearings after
the conclusion of trial for the payment of counseling and professional assistance concerning
the children and their custodial problems.
G. Petitioner's sole and separate property consisting of the following:
I glass and wood table and lamps
King size waterbed and dresser and nightstand
Old Consol TV Wood Cathy's
Cathy's personal belongings stored in basement at the rental property
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H. A credit of $120,000 for half of the equity in the 25% A-1 Rental interest; a credit
of $101,000 of half of the equity in the Dave and Cathy Rental buildings in Price, Utah; a
credit of $2000 for the parties' half interest in the 22' Bayliner Boat and its trailer and
accessories,

TO THE RESPONDENT:
A. The 25% interest in A-1 Rental and Lawn Equipment, Inc., free and clear of any
claim by the Petitioner thereon;
B. The Dave and Cathy Business rental buildings referred to as the "Harmond
Property" and "Second South Property", in Price, Utah, free and clear of any claim by the
Petitioner thereon
C. The Respondent is awarded all of his retirement benefits, free and clear of any
claims of the Petitioner
D. 2000 Ford F-350 pickup truck
E. 2002 Corvette, subject to the indebtedness thereon
F. One half of the Dave & Cathy Rental Business Equipment, which the Court orders
to be immediately divided pursuant to agreement of the parties if they can expeditiously
reach an agreement thereby avoiding serious tax consequences, or placed on the market
and sold. If a sale is necessary, then each party is ordered to pay one half of the costs of
any sale and the equipment preparation and transportation costs and each party is ordered
to pay one half of any tax consequences incurred because of a sale.
G. The parties' 50% interest in the 22' Bayliner boat, trailer and it's accessories.
H. One half of the Zions' Rental Business Account #48-472419 in the approximate
amount of $60,257 as of February of 2005, augmented by the return to the account of any
monies subsequently taken from this account by Mr. Child for personal use, including any
payments on the Corvette previously determined to be a gift; and augmented by payment
into this account from A-1 Rental, Inc. of any rental monies due and owing for the use of the
Dave and Cathy Child rental properties; but reduced by subtracting all necessary expenses,
such as taxes, insurances and all legitimate maintenance costs for the family properties and
further reduced by those amounts from this account authorized by the Court in hearings after
the conclusion of trial for the payment of counseling and professional assistance concerning
the children and their custodial problems.
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I. Respondent's sole and separate property consisting of the following:
15-20 piece ceramic village from Dave's Mother
Dave's Motorcycle boots—Alpine Star
Water Skis
Dave's snowmobile helmet in trailer
Dave's snowmobile boots I trailer
Three garbage sacks in the garage filled with Dave's clothing
Dave's trophies
Dave's marble telephone from Italy
2 boxes of misc. Kiwanis banners
Christmas Town that goes with ceramic village
Decorations from the Hall closet upstairs
Dave's snowmobile suit
Little giant ladder model 10203
Grandmother's dresser for Dave's daughter
Copies of all photos of the children in the marital residence
The $4500 investment in Central Bank Corporate Stock
J. The Time Share in Mazatlan, provided that Respondent pays any and all
arrearages or at least terminates the property interest with no financial burden to the
Petitioner herein.
K. The household goods and furniture purchased by Respondent after the separation
of the parties.
L. A credit of $175,000 for Respondent's equity in the marital residence; $5000 credit
for Respondent's premarital 25% interest in A-1 Rental and Lawn Equipment, Inc.;
$400 credit for account #291; and $1000 credit for the cash in the safe at the home,

13. With respect to the balance of the bank accounts, the Court concludes that the $800 in
account #291 is a marital asset and should be divided equally between the parties. The
$8500 in Account #441 is the remainder of the Petitioner's share of the monies that the Court
divided under its April 22, 2003 Order on Order to Show Cause and belongs to her. The
$2000 allegedly in the safe at the personal residence is also marital property and is ordered
divided equally. The $4500 investment in Central Bank Corporate Stock, the parties agree,
is the sole and separate property of the Respondent and is awarded to him free and clear of
any claim by the Petitioner thereon. If any of the foregoing accounts has been reduced, the
party having possession of the asset or the passbook shall be charged with that possession
and must make up the difference immediately.
14. Any tax refunds received, or to be received, are designated to be marital property and
are to be divided equally between these two parties up to the year this Court granted the
Divorce in the Bifurcated hearing. The same may be necessary going forward depending
upon how the parties file their income tax returns prior to the effective date of their divorce.
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15. After the above divisions have been made as ordered herein, and the credits balanced
as outlined herein, each party is ordered to trade out credits against agreed items or pay the
corresponding credit to the other party if such credit is not offset.
16. Each party is ordered to pay his or her own attorney's fees, court costs and expert
witness fees.
!7. The Court has admonished the parties for their lack of good faith efforts in following this
Court's temporary orders and the Court reserves the right to, at sometime in the future,
impose sanctions. The Court prefers to let the parties contemplate what those sanctions
might be and hopes that their contemplation will favorably impact their decisions involving
their two wonderful (by ALL reports) boys.

7L—

_dayof Jaae?,2006

Dated this

^

Judge Bruce K. Halliday
District Court Judge

7

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 024700194 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this

^

NAME
RODNEY R PARKER
ATTORNEY PET
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 11TH FLR
POB 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145
JOANE P WHITE
ATTORNEY RES
10 WEST MAIN ST
PRICE UT 84501
20#(£

day of

Page 1 (last)

